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ABSTRACT 
We economically motivate and then test a range of hypotheses regarding performance and risk differences 
between UCITS-compliant and other hedge funds. The latter exhibit more suspicious return patterns than do 
absolute return UCITS (ARUs), but ARUs exhibit higher levels of operational risk. We find evidence of a strong 
liquidity premium: hedge funds offer investors less liquidity than do ARUs yet exhibit better risk-adjusted 
performance. Our findings are substantially unchanged under various robustness tests and adjustments for 
possible selection bias. The liquidity premium for ARUs and their lack of performance persistence have 
implications for both investors and policy makers. 
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1. Introduction 
One goal of financial regulation is to protect investors by ensuring that markets are fair and that 
fraudulent activities are minimized. Despite calls in 2009 by the G20 (an international finance minister 
and central bank governor forum) for coordinated international financial regulation following the 
2007–2008 financial crisis, financial regulation continues to vary widely by country. With regard to 
alternative investment funds, regulatory responses – for example, the US Dodd–Frank Act and the 
European Union’s AIFMD1 – also display significant geographic differences with regard to liquidity 
requirements, remuneration rules, and risk limits. Such differences almost certainly have a welfare 
impact by way of the resulting performance and risk differences among alternative investment funds, 
which are held by pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and other investors. A particular type of EU 
investment fund regulation is UCITS,
2
 which has global implications because it involves unique and 
testable restrictions (e.g., the effect of liquidity terms on fund performance) intended to enhance 
investor protection. We use UCITS restrictions on hedge funds as a natural testing ground for assessing 
several hypotheses concerning hedge fund performance while carefully adjusting for selection bias. 
The UCITS funds universe is economically important, and UCITS funds are recognized – and 
can be marketed – in 75 countries worldwide. The assets under management (AuM) of UCITS funds 
amount to some $8 trillion, which is comparable to the US mutual fund industry’s $11.6 trillion.3 
Outside the United States, UCITS funds account for more than half of fund assets worldwide, and 
about three fourths of the funds publicly sold in Asia are UCITS funds.
4
 The impact of UCITS is felt 
also by non-European investors and managers. For instance, Paulson & Co. (a renowned US hedge 
fund management firm) launched a UCITS version of its flagship offshore hedge fund with Deutsche 
Bank in 2010.
5
 
Alternative investment fund managers are increasingly deciding to implement alternative 
strategies through more regulated vehicles so that they can gain access to the assets of retail and 
institutional investors, which typically prefer funds that are more regulated and more liquid. The 
Dodd–Frank requirement for hedge funds to register with the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
                                                 
1
 The objective of this Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive is to create a comprehensive and secure framework 
for the supervision and prudential oversight of such managers in the EU. 
2
 The acronym UCITS stands for Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities, which is the European 
harmonized and regulated fund product. It can be sold on a cross-border basis within the European Union based solely on its 
authorization in a single EU member state. See Appendix A for additional details about UCITS. 
3
 See the ICI (2012) factbook and http://www.efama.org. 
4
 Carne Group, “UCITS Guide for Alternative Managers,” 30 June 2012. 
5
 Sam Jones, “Investment management: Europe’s changing face,” Financial Times, 10 May 2012. 
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(SEC) has increased the popularity of liquid alternatives in the United States, as illustrated by the 
following quote from the Financial Times: “An American version of the ‘hedge-fund lite’ Ucits funds 
popular in Europe – so-called liquid alternative funds, registered under the Investment Company Act of 
1940 – is in vogue.”6 
Yet packaging hedge fund strategies in a traditional format is far from straightforward, and it 
raises many challenges both for managers and for the regulatory format’s brand. It is crucial to 
determine whether structuring hedge fund strategies through vehicles that are more regulated will yield 
the same level of returns or rather compromise those strategies – given the constraints imposed by 
regulations: investment restrictions, liquidity requirements, operational requirements, and risk limits.
7
 
 
What are the main differences between regulation governing hedge funds and UCITS funds? 
First, to enhance transparency and protect investors against misreporting, regulation imposes tight net 
asset value (NAV) reporting requirements and valuation rules for UCITS-compliant funds while off-
shore hedge funds are not subject to such requirements. Second, to address the operational risks that 
may emanate from organizational deficiencies or conflicts of interest the UCITS directive requires 
UCITS managers to produce and maintain on an on-going basis a so-called Risk Management Policy 
(‘RMP’) document and the directive imposes strict requirements for organizational and internal 
controls and for conflicts of interest. Although all investment managers will have to identify and 
effectively manage conflicts of interest in the design and implementation of their risk management 
frameworks, hedge funds are not required to produce a RMP document. Third, several UCITS rules 
constrain the investment opportunity set and possible portfolio weights. The concepts of liquidity and 
transferability drive asset selection and portfolio construction for a UCITS and  UCITS rules limit the 
investments of UCITS to “eligible assets” and preclude physical short-selling.8 Fourth, UCITS funds 
are required to have a separate risk management function and are subject to leverage limits, and value-
at-risk limits, requirements that do not explicitly apply to equivalent hedge funds. Fifth, as mentioned 
earlier, UCITS funds have to provide bi-weekly liquidity while hedge funds do not have any 
restrictions regarding notice, redemption or lockup periods.  
                                                 
6
 Ellen Kelleher, “Investor demand drives US move to alternative mutual funds,” Financial Times, 1 December 2013. 
7
 Hedge funds have an absolute return objective – namely, achieving returns that are uncorrelated with the market (Ineichen 
2002). The absolute return objective implies that risk reduction techniques (e.g., long–short strategies and taking positions 
in derivatives) are used to reduce benchmark exposure levels. 
8
 Broadly speaking transferable and liquid assets are considered eligible but there are some exceptions. For reasons of space 
we report details about asset eligibility in Appendix. 
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The above regulatory comparison shows that, on the one hand, the UCITS directive imposes 
restrictions on alternative investment fund managers that in some respects are even more stringent than 
those imposed by SEC regulation on hedge fund managers. On the other hand, UCITS rules are less 
stringent than those that must be followed in the United States by so-called ’40 Act alternative funds.  
These funds (which are governed by the US Investment Company Act of 1940) must provide daily 
liquidity, cannot exceed 33% gross leverage, and are not allowed to charge performance-based fees. In 
contrast, UCITS funds need provide liquidity just only every other week, can use higher leverage, and 
can charge performance-based fees. The obvious implication is that UCITS-compliant hedge funds 
may exhibit performance and risk characteristics that differ from those of other hedge funds. In this 
paper, we focus on UCITS (rather than ’40 Act) fund rules because they are less stringent and so may 
facilitate our replication of the strategies employed by hedge funds. We gather data on UCITS-
compliant hedge funds, also known as absolute return UCITS, and compare them with data from a 
large global hedge fund database. Thus we distinguish between these absolute return UCITS 
(abbreviated ARUs) and other, non-UCITS hedge funds abbreviated HFs, for expositional 
convenience, even though UCITS funds are also hedge funds). The current size of the ARU universe is 
estimated to be $230 billion, or about 12% of the $1,981 billion in global hedge fund assets; note that 
the number of ARU funds grew fivefold over our 2003–2013. 
The geographically disparate hedge fund regulation reviewed above enables several testable 
implications. We start by focusing on returns misreporting and asset illiquidity. The prior literature 
(e.g., Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 2011; Bollen and Pool 2008, 2009) documents that hedge funds’ 
reported returns are sometimes suspicious. Regulation imposes tight net asset value (NAV) reporting 
requirements and valuation rules for UCITS-compliant funds. These requirements are likely to make 
return misreporting more difficult. Therefore, our Misvaluation Hypothesis states that UCITS funds 
should engage less in return management than do hedge funds. We use a set of “red flags” proposed by 
Bollen and Pool (2012) to establish that hedge funds’ reported returns exhibit relatively more 
suspicious patterns.
9
 So in terms of accurate valuations, our results are consistent with interpreting 
UCITS regulation as being protective of investors and thus as having achieved one of its goals. 
Second, our Operational Risk Hypothesis is that such risk should be lower for UCITS-
compliant funds than for other, presumably less transparent hedge funds. The intuition is that the 
UCITS directive imposes strict requirements for organizational and internal controls and for conflicts 
                                                 
9
 We carry out a range of robustness tests to disentangle returns misreporting from asset illiquidity in this context. 
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of interest. To test this hypothesis and measure operational risk, we follow the literature initiated by 
Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008, 2009) and use information revealed in the Forms ADV 
that funds must submit to the SEC. Given that ARUs are domiciled in EU member countries and are 
thus are less likely reporting to US-based regulators and filing Forms ADV, we control carefully for 
the potential effect of selection bias by means of the Heckman correction. We discover that UCITS 
regulation does not, in fact, reduce operational risk; that is, we find in a univariate setting that ARUs 
are actually more exposed to operational risk measures. In order to understand this unexpected finding, 
we investigate further the sources of operational risk. We find that ARUs typically have more possible 
conflicts of interest than do HFs. In particular, ARUs exhibit more external conflicts of interest in the 
form of close relationships with banks and brokers. Furthermore, when we model in a multivariate 
setting whether UCITS-compliant funds have more “problems” or past violations, we find an 
insignificant relation between UCITS structure and past violations after controlling for the role played 
by our indicator variables for conflicts of interest. Thus, once we include control variables, UCITS-
compliant funds do not have less operational risk than other hedge funds, which suggests that tighter 
regulation does not mitigate operational risk concerns. Our finding regarding the role of variables 
related to external conflicts of interest may simply reflect differences in the financial market structure 
of Europe versus the US, since most fund management companies are based in either of these two. 
Fund management companies are more intertwined with (universal) banks in Europe, which creates 
positive answers to the question of potential conflicts of interest.  
Third, motivated by UCITS restrictions regarding eligible assets, short-selling restrictions and 
diversification requirements, as part of our Performance Hypothesis, we hypothesize that ARUs exhibit 
lower risk-adjusted returns than HFs. The UCITS directive specifies which assets are deemed eligible 
assets and also specifies diversification requirements. Measuring the risk–return trade-off is a complex 
issue; hence we employ several different metrics to assess tail risk and volatility (Patton 2009) while 
controlling for the effects of serial correlation in fund returns (cf. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 2004). 
Consistent with the prediction of this hypothesis, we find that UCITS-compliant funds generally 
generate lower risk-adjusted performance. Our results suggest that the restrictions on the investment 
opportunity set have an economically and statistically significant effect on the risk-adjusted 
performance of ARUs compared to HFs. A potential concern when comparing ARUs to HFs is 
selection bias, which may arise from hedge fund management companies launching UCITS share 
classes only for liquid hedge funds. We show that our results are not affected by selection bias by 
 5 
carrying out a Heckman adjustment. 
Third, we formulate the Risk Hypothesis based on UCITS’ rules that impose limits on value-at-
risk and leverage and that mandate a separate risk management function. Our Risk Hypothesis states 
that ARUs exhibit lower risk than HFs. We find that ARUs exhibit more systematic risk, especially in 
terms of equity market exposure, than do other hedge funds. This result is consistent with the hurdles 
encountered when transporting hedge fund techniques to the UCITS universe. Because UCITS funds 
face restrictions regarding the use of derivatives and short-selling to hedge market risks, their 
consequent reduced flexibility may well make ARU returns more cyclical than those of HFs. Our 
results therefore suggest that, even though UCITS regulation puts strong emphasis on protecting 
investors from market risk, hedge funds that are less regulated seem to have internal controls that 
discourage them from taking excessive risk.
10
  
Liquidity is one of the pillars of UCITS regulation, and the asset pricing literature has identified 
liquidity premia in many markets; these considerations lead to our Liquidity Restrictions Hypothesis. 
According to the UCITS directive, funds must manage all aspects of liquidity risk and must provide 
redemption facilities to their clients at least twice a month. In contrast, hedge funds are not subject to 
such tight regulation. Hence our hypothesis posits that ARUs deliver lower average performance than 
funds with strict share restrictions, which are able to earn a liquidity premium for holding less liquid 
assets (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Pastor and Stambaugh 2003). 
Our findings have policy implications and raise questions about the resulting welfare effects 
and an acceptable liquidity–performance trade-off. Although UCITS-compliant hedge funds 
underperform other hedge funds on average, the performance of these two groups converges when we 
compare subsets of the two fund types that are matched in terms of liquidity (i.e., share restrictions). So 
that we can better understand the economic mechanism that underlies investor-level share restrictions 
helping funds manage their portfolios more efficiently, we investigate whether leverage and margin 
constraints are less binding for funds that impose tight share restrictions. We find that hedge funds with 
long redemption periods have more exposure to the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting-against-beta 
factor, whereas funds providing generous liquidity terms (e.g., ARUs) do not have significant loadings 
on that factor. This result is consistent with the interpretation that more liquid funds are more leverage 
constrained and therefore encounter more obstacles to investing in low-beta assets, which (according to 
Frazzini and Pedersen) tend to have high risk-adjusted returns. 
                                                 
10
 Cassar and Gerakos (2010) document evidence suggesting that internal controls are stronger in offshore hedge funds that 
have potentially higher agency costs as well as limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. 
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A possible criticism of our analysis so far is that, we are not comparing equivalent funds. Thus 
our baseline analysis, which compares an ARU fund from management company A with an HF from 
management company B, may be comparing “apples and oranges”. By matching funds within the same 
management companies or the fund managers that simultaneously manage UCITS-compliant funds and 
hedge funds, we address the potential selection bias explicitly and to confirm that the lower 
performance of UCITS-compliant funds is due to restrictions – not lower fund manager skills. In 
robustness tests we carefully match, within management companies, the closest possible UCITS and 
non-UCITS fund pairs. We then use information on fund manager names to investigate whether our 
results hold even for managers that run UCITS-compliant and other hedge funds side by side. Using 
data obtained from the EurekaHedge database, we detect 276 side-by-side management cases involving 
138 UCITS-compliant funds and 164 hedge funds.
11
 After controlling for firm-level effects and for 
effects related to manager skill, we find that UCITS restrictions play an important role. The difference 
in risk-adjusted returns to UCITS versus non-UCITS funds can be explained by differences in liquidity 
and leverage. In this way, we uncover a strong performance–liquidity trade-off as well as evidence of 
less binding leverage constraints – even after restricting our analysis to matched pairs of HFs and 
ARUs within the same management company and managers that simultaneously run UCITS-compliant 
funds and hedge funds. 
Average performance differences are important from a general economic perspective, but 
performance persistence is more important in investors’ perspective. Thus we are led to formulate our 
Persistence Hypothesis. The ARU universe is a fertile setting in which test whether performance 
persists and whether this persistence could be exploited in practice. There is theoretical and empirical 
evidence suggesting that the transparency required by regulatory rules may be harmful to UCITS 
investors. Glode and Green (2011) show theoretically that the performance persistence of hedge funds 
can be explained by the desire for secrecy. Such persistence may not be due entirely to skill, and it 
could result from techniques or strategies of which other managers are not aware. Their model’s 
predictions are supported by Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Wang (2013), who document that hedge funds’ 
confidential holdings are associated with superior performance. Investors in ARUs could (at least in 
principle) use the bi-weekly regulatory liquidity requirement to rebalance their portfolios on a monthly 
basis. However, our empirical results indicate that there are limits to the ability of investors to exploit 
this superior liquidity because ARUs exhibit less performance persistence than some other hedge 
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 Size of our sample is comparable to Nohel, Wang and Zheng (2010) that document 344 side-by-side management cases 
involving 693 mutual funds and 538 hedge funds. 
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funds. 
This paper sheds light on the debate over the costs and benefits of increased financial 
regulation. Given that such regulation is intended to protect investors, one of our main contributions to 
this debate is quantifying the cost of regulation and liquidity requirements. Estimates based on our data 
show that the indirect cost of UCITS regulation is around 2% per annum in terms of risk-adjusted 
returns. Because there is evidence of a substantial liquidity premium in alternative investment funds, 
policy makers should carefully consider the effect of higher liquidity requirements on the returns that 
alternative investment funds can be expected to generate. And since institutional investors (e.g., 
pension funds) are one of the largest groups of hedge fund investors, such requirements ultimately 
affect the growth of pension assets in Europe and other countries where ARU funds can be marketed. 
Similarly, the lack of performance persistence among ARUs should caution retail and institutional 
hedge fund investors against “returns chasing”. 
Our paper is related to four main streams of the literature. First, there is an extensive empirical 
asset pricing literature that addresses the effect of geography on asset price performance.
12
 Included in 
this stream are papers on the effect of domicile on hedge fund performance, but we are not aware of 
any paper that has examined the effect of UCITS restrictions on ARU performance. 
Second, the effect of share restrictions on hedge fund performance has been studied by several 
authors.
13
 However, none of these studies examine the liquidity terms of ARUs or the effect of any 
such terms on their relative performance, and none have compared ARU performance persistence as 
compared with hedge funds that feature less stringent liquidity terms.
14
 
Third, there is a growing literature on hedged mutual funds and UCITS funds. Agarwal, 
Boyson, and Naik (2009) compare the performance of hedged mutual funds to traditional mutual 
funds, whereas our focus is on UCITS and non-UCITS hedge funds because these two groups are more 
likely to allow alternative investment strategies.
15
 In comparison with our research, earlier studies of 
UCITS funds (Stefanini, Derossi, Meoli, and Vismara 2010; Tuchschmid, Wallerstein, and Zanolin 
2010; Darolles 2011) use smaller samples of UCITS hedge funds and do not analyze the effect of 
UCITS restrictions on suspicious returns, operational risk, performance, or performance persistence. 
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 See, for example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Malloy (2005), Teo (2010 and Aragon, Liang, and Park (2013). 
13
 See Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), Teo (2010), Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and 
Wermers (2008), Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo (2013), and Cao, Farnsworth, Liang, and Lo (2013). 
14
 Amihud, Mendelson, and Pederson (2013) provide a good summary of the market liquidity literature. 
15
 Other related studies include Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi (2010), Nohel, Wang and Zheng (2010) and Deuskar, Pollet, 
Wang, and Zheng (2011).  
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Fourth, our work utilizes the notions of operational risk and suspicious return flags as 
developed in earlier papers. Those papers include Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwartz (2008, 
2009, 2012), Bollen and Pool (2008, 2009, 2012), and Cassar and Gerakos (2010, 2011). We are the 
first to apply these ideas to the economically important group of ARUs and to compare ARUs 
with HFs. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the regulatory restrictions imposed 
on UCITS funds and motivates the resulting testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the HF and ARU 
universe, and Section 4 summarizes the empirical results on differences in operational risk between 
these two fund types. Section 5 focuses on the effects of fund domicile, liquidity, and leverage 
constraints on fund performance and risk. Section 6 reports results on performance persistence toward 
the end of answering whether investors could, in practice, exploit the superior liquidity of ARUs. We 
conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. UCITS Regulatory Restrictions and Testable Hypotheses 
As mentioned in Section 1, there are relatively few academic studies of UCITS mutual funds and 
ARUs despite their economic importance. However, there are hundreds of papers on the US mutual 
fund universe, which is comparable in size to the UCITS universe. So we begin by providing some 
background on UCITS funds before motivating our hypotheses. The UCITS directive was implemented 
by the EU in 1985 with the aims of facilitating cross-border markets in investment funds and 
maintaining a high level of investor protection. The directive was aimed at regulating the organization 
and oversight of UCITS funds; it imposed constraints concerning diversification, liquidity, derivatives, 
and use of leverage. Appendix A summarizes the evolvement of UCITS regulation. 
We focus on comparing absolute return UCITS funds (ARUs) and other hedge funds (HFs), 
including offshore hedge funds, US onshore hedge funds, and other European onshore hedge funds.  
What are the main differences between regulation governing hedge funds and ARUs? We 
highlight five main differences and then motivate a set of testable hypotheses based on the differences 
in regulation.  
First, to enhance transparency and protect investors against misreporting, UCITS regulation 
imposes tight net asset value (NAV) reporting requirements and valuation rules for UCITS-compliant 
funds while off-shore hedge funds are not subject to such requirements. These requirements are likely 
to make return misreporting more difficult. The UCITS fund format requires funds to report net asset 
 9 
valuations on a daily basis.
16
 An outside firm may be appointed to undertake these valuations, but if 
they are performed internally then the process must be independent of portfolio management per se in 
order to avoid conflicts of interest.  
Motivated by the findings of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011) and of Bollen and Pool (2008, 
2009) that hedge funds misreport or “manage” their returns, our Misvaluation Hypothesis states that 
UCITS funds engage less (than do HFs) in return management. We test this claim by constructing a set 
of indicators proposed by Bollen and Pool (2012) to detect suspicious patterns in reported fund returns. 
It is worth constructing a large set of proxies owing to the challenges inherent in differentiating 
between asset illiquidity and returns misreporting. After all, Casser and Gerakos (2011) offer evidence 
suggesting that asset illiquidity is a major factor driving the anomalous properties of self-reported 
hedge fund returns, and Jorion and Schwarz (2014) show that incentive fees can mechanistically create 
discontinuity or a kink in the distribution of net returns.
17
  
Second, to address the operational risks that could emanate from organizational deficiencies or 
conflicts of interest the UCITS directive requires ARU managers to produce and maintain on an on-
going basis a so-called Risk Management Policy (‘RMP’) document and the directive imposes strict 
requirements for organizational and internal controls and for conflicts of interest. Although, in 
principle, all investment managers have to identify and effectively manage conflicts of interest in the 
design and implementation of their risk management framework, hedge funds are generally not 
required to produce an equivalent of the RMP document. 
According to the UCITS IV directive and European Securities and Markets Authority 
guidelines, all risks that could be material to the fund should be properly addressed by the management 
company in the RMP document. A fund’s policy should address its exposure to market risks, liquidity 
risks, counterparty risks, and all other risks – including operational risk – that might be material to each 
UCITS it manages. Given this explicit focus on risk management and operational risk the question 
arises of whether the UCITS directive succeeds in reducing operational risk for ARUs compared to 
other hedge funds. 
Following discovery of the Madoff Ponzi scheme, operational risk has been of special concern 
to investors, regulators, and academics (see, e.g., Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz 2008, 2009, 
                                                 
16
 Generally speaking, the latest official market closing prices must be used when valuing publicly traded securities; when 
those are not available, the “fair market value” should be used. Rules require that UCITS funds must establish valuation 
procedures for derivatives that are of an appropriate level of complexity and must disclose those procedures to investors. 
17
 In a separate hypothesis we examine the effect of differences in liquidity requirements on fund performance below. 
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2012). It is interesting that one of the Madoff feeder funds, LuxAlpha, was a UCITS-regulated fund. 
Was this case an exception? Do ARUs actually have lower operational risk than hedge funds? 
To discover whether or not UCITS management companies are better than others at managing 
operational risk, we follow Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008, 2009) and construct a set of 
operational risk measures using the information revealed in Form ADV filings. Doing so allows us to 
test the implications of the “organization directive”, which spells out the requirements for 
organizational and internal control and stipulates procedures for addressing conflicts of interest. Given 
the focus of this directive, our Operational Risk Hypothesis predicts that, as compared with less 
regulated hedge funds, UCITS funds should have lower levels of operational risk and fewer conflicts of 
interest. That being said, Cassar and Gerakos (2010) use a sample of due diligence reports to document 
that internal controls are stronger in offshore hedge funds that face potentially higher agency costs and 
have limited legal redress against fraud or financial misstatements. So it remains an open question 
whether tighter regulation can protect investors from operational risk – a question that we examine in 
this paper. 
Third, several UCITS rules related to eligible assets and disallowed strategies constrain the 
investment opportunity set and the possible portfolio weights which can be expected to reduce the 
expected risk-adjusted returns of the fund. The concepts of liquidity and transferability drive asset 
selection and portfolio construction for UCIT funds. Broadly speaking transferable and liquid assets 
such as exchange traded assets are considered eligible but there are some exceptions. The use of 
derivatives is subject to stringent requirements that aim at protecting the investor from excess leverage 
and counterparty risk.
18
 Derivatives under the UCITS regime may only be entered into where the 
underlying of the derivative would otherwise be an eligible asset under the so called “look through 
rule”. For reasons of space we report details about asset eligibility in Appendix.19 A second UCITS rule 
that can be expected to reduce the investment opportunity set relative to hedge funds is that physical 
(or uncovered) short selling of securities is prohibited for UCITS. 
20
 Since there is evidence (Jones, 
Reed and Waller (2015)) that large short selling positions can be very profitable, restrictions on the 
                                                 
18
 The UCITS I directive already allowed hedging via derivatives in 1985, but in 2002 the UCITS III directive extended the 
permissible use of derivatives to speculation. Depending on whether derivatives are used to speculate or to hedge, funds that 
use them may have higher or lower risk than those that do not. 
19
 The following categories of assets, for example, are not considered eligible: precious metals, real estate, commodities, 
funds of funds and non-UCITS hedge funds. 
20
 However, it is possible to obtain synthetic short exposure by using derivatives, most commonly via swaps with an ISDA 
counterparty (on single names or the entire short book), or by using contracts for differences. However, these are imperfect 
solutions since they may not allow to replicate the payoff of a short position for each asset and they may do so at an 
additional costs for the intermediary involved. 
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implementation of short strategies might reduce expected returns for ARUs compared to other hedge 
funds. A third UCITS rule that may affect the investment opportunity set is the diversification rule that 
is intended to protect investors from excessive exposure to the idiosyncratic risk posed by any single 
issuer. The foundation of diversification rules within the framework of UCITS is the so-called 5/10/40 
rule as laid out in the UCITS Directive. The rule states that a UCITS cannot invest more than 10% of 
its NAV in securities issued by a single corporate issuer (the rules in relation to sovereign issuers are 
described below).  Furthermore, the sum of all exposures greater than 5% should not exceed 40% of 
the fund’s NAV. This rule may, however, prevent portfolio managers from implementing high 
conviction ideas that require concentrated positions (Cohen, Polk and Silli 2010) including certain 
hedge fund activist strategies (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008), and thus reduce the investment 
opportunity set. To the extent that these constrains the investment opportunity set and the possible 
portfolio weights it can be expected to reduce the expected risk-adjusted performance of the fund. This 
motivates the Performance Hypothesis which states that due to the more restrictive investment 
opportunity set ARUs have lower risk-adjusted performance than hedge funds. 
Fourth, UCITS funds are required to have a separate risk management function and are subject 
to leverage limits, and value-at-risk limits, requirements that do not explicitly apply to equivalent 
hedge funds. These requirements can be expected to reduce the exposure of ARUs to market risk. We 
therefore test our Risk Hypothesis, which states that (for a given investment objective) the (systematic) 
risk of ARUs is lower than that of other HFs. European Union countries have some leeway in 
implementing the VaR management requirements of the UCITS directive.
21
 The UCITS Directive 
restricts the use of leverage with the objective of protecting investors from excessive borrowing, and 
has provisions that address the maximum amount of leverage funds can incur and how to ensure that 
funds have adequate coverage. Restrictions on the use of derivatives can work in the other direction, 
however, since they can limit a fund’s ability to hedge against market downturns, which leads us to test 
for whether or not the returns on ARUs are more cyclical than those on other hedge funds. We use 
exposure to common risk factors (e.g., market beta) to assess the cyclicality of hedge fund returns. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, investment and risk restrictions may prevent managers from risk shifting 
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 Investment managers measure global exposure/leverage either using the (i) commitment approach or the (ii) Value at 
Risk (‘VaR’) approach.  The commitment approach is appropriate for a UCITS that does not use complex derivatives or 
trade derivatives extensively.  This approach is based on the market value of the asset underlying the derivative and sums up 
the aggregate absolute value of the underlying exposures’ notional values.  The VaR approach can be further subdivided 
into (i) an absolute and (ii) a relative VaR approach.  The maximum absolute VaR limit is set at 20% over a 20-day holding 
period and based on a 99% confidence interval.   
 12 
– that is, strategically changing portfolio volatility in order to maximize the value of implicit 
management incentive contracts and fees (Buraschi, Kosowski, and Sritrakul 2014). Of course, even 
without regulatory oversight it is possible for a hedge fund to have tight internal controls on risk taking. 
Indeed, Cassar and Gerakos (2013) use a sample of due diligence reports to find that funds using 
formal risk and stress testing models performed better during the extreme down months of 2008 and 
generally had less exposure to systematic risk. Their results also suggest that funds employing tests for 
VaR and for stress predicted their own performance more accurately in a short-term equity bear 
market. In addition, Aragon and Martin (2012) find that hedge funds using options deliver better 
performance and with less risk than those that do not use options.
22
 It is therefore important to 
investigate whether UCITS regulation can actually protect investors from financial risk. 
Fifth, according to regulatory rules, UCITS funds must carefully monitor and manage liquidity 
risk and valuation; they must also account for liquidity risk when investing in any financial assets. This 
leads us to formulate our Liquidity Restrictions Hypothesis which posits that ARUs deliver lower 
average performance than funds with strict share restrictions, which are able to earn a liquidity 
premium for holding less liquid assets (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Pastor and Stambaugh 2003). 
 The UCITS directive defines liquidity risk as “the risk that a position in the UCITS portfolio 
cannot be sold, liquidated or closed at limited cost in an adequately short time frame and that the ability 
of the UCITS to [repurchase or redeem its units at the request of any unit holder] is thereby 
compromised.” These rules imply that funds should consider, for example, bid–ask spreads and the 
secondary market’s quality. In practice, funds are effectively required to allow as much of 20% of their 
NAV to be redeemed at any time. Only 10% of NAV can be invested in illiquid assets – though all 
redemption requests must be honored even in this case. Funds that wish to remain UCITS-compliant 
must, at least twice each month, not only value their investments but also provide liquidity to their 
investors. In contrast, non-UCITS hedge funds are less regulated and so can accept longer redemption 
periods; they can even introduce “gates” and “side pockets” for illiquid, hard-to-value assets (Aiken, 
Clifford and Ellis 2014). 
Furthermore, the distributional properties of ARUs and HFs are likely affected by the liquidity 
of their underlying assets. The UCITS directives contain a range of rules concerning concentration and 
counterparty risk. For example, exposure to any money market instrument or other security issued by a 
given party cannot exceed 10% of NAV; in combination with derivatives, it cannot exceed 20% of 
                                                 
22
 Our research is also related to that of Koski and Pontiff (1999) and of Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004), 
who investigate the difference in performance between mutual funds that use derivatives and those that do not. 
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NAV. Such restrictions reduce a UCITS fund’s capacity to hold concentrated portfolios of potentially 
illiquid securities. 
According to asset pricing theory, the return on an illiquid asset is associated with an illiquidity 
premium.
23
 Aragon (2007) finds that hedge funds with strict share restrictions (in the form of longer 
lockup, notice, and redemption periods) can earn a premium. Aragon, Liang, and Park (2013) report 
that onshore US funds are associated with greater share restrictions than offshore funds; these authors 
also provide some evidence that better performance is delivered by onshore than by offshore funds. 
Sadka (2010) demonstrates that liquidity risk explains the cross section of hedge fund performance. 
Teo (2011) shows that some HFs granting favourable redemption options are exposed to liquidity risk 
arising from asset-liability mismatch and since ARUs are relatively liquid it is interesting to examine 
whether they are more exposed to liquidity risk.  
The difference in funding liquidity risk may also explain performance differences observed 
between ARUs and HFs. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) present a model with leverage and margin 
constraints that vary by investor type. In their dynamic model with constrained investors, some 
investors cannot use leverage and therefore overweight high-beta assets; hence those assets yield lower 
returns. Other investors can use leverage, but they face margin constraints and thus may sometimes be 
forced to de-leverage; these investors underweight (or short-sell) high-beta assets and buy low-beta 
assets that they then leverage up. Hedge funds with longer notice and redemption periods than ARUs 
may be more exposed to this betting-against-beta factor. The reasoning just given indicates that our 
Liquidity Restriction Hypothesis is related to the effect of liquidity or share restrictions and tests 
whether less liquid funds (as defined by their notice and redemption periods) exhibit better 
performance, are more exposed to market liquidity risk (Pastor and Stambaugh 2003), or are more 
exposed to leverage and margin constraints (Frazzini and Pedersen 2014). 
As mentioned previously, a major difference between ARUs and HFs concerns fund liquidity. 
Apart from their effects on fund performance, differences in fund liquidity raise the question of 
whether investors can exploit superior liquidity by periodically rebalancing their portfolio of funds. In 
particular, we look for evidence of differences between ARUs and HFs as regards performance 
persistence. On the one hand, an ARU’s bi-weekly liquidity requirement may enable investors to 
exploit any performance persistence. On the other hand, the mandatory disclosure of a fund’s 
investment strategies may be detrimental to its performance. 
                                                 
23
 Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2006) provide a comprehensive survey that discusses the role of liquidity in asset 
pricing theory. 
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Glode and Green (2011) rationalize performance persistence for hedge funds by showing that it 
can be explained by the desire for secrecy. They argue that superior returns may not be entirely due to 
manager ability; in particular, outperforming the market may be attributable also to strategies or 
techniques that could be expropriated and exploited by others if they were adequately informed. This 
view is supported by the research of Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Wang (2013), who investigate the 
confidential holdings of hedge funds that are disclosed (with a delay) through filed amendments to 
SEC Form 13F. These authors document that the confidential holdings exhibit superior performance 
for up to 12 months yet usually take longer to build. 
The UCITS rules require that funds publish a prospectus, annual and semi-annual reports, and a 
Key Investor Information Document (KIID).
24
 In other words, a UCITS fund must provide 
comprehensive details of its investment goals and strategies and of the associated risks. The 
implication is that alternative UCITS funds must disclose much more information about their trading 
strategies than do other hedge funds. In contrast, non-UCITS hedge funds are often sold through 
private placement and offered only to accredited or qualified investors in the United States and to 
sophisticated qualifying investors in Europe. When funds are not offered to the public there are fewer 
disclosure requirements, which may benefit these other hedge funds. 
Thus our Persistence Hypothesis states that ARUs should exhibit less performance persistence 
than other HFs because the latter’s trading strategies are more secretive. The performance persistence 
of these HFs may be driven also by their more stringent share restrictions generating a liquidity 
premium and hence a consistent alpha. Finally, in testing this hypothesis – and also as a robustness test 
– we check for whether performance persistence changes (for either ARUs or other HFs) after liquidity 
is taken into account. 
 
3. Description of Hedge Fund Universe 
3.1. Absolute Return UCITS and Hedge Fund Databases 
In this section we describe the aggregate ARU and HF databases. We combine five major hedge fund 
databases – BarclayHedge, EurekaHedge, Hedge Fund Research (HFR), Morningstar, and TASS 
Lipper – to form an aggregate data set. Our sample period starts from January 2003, which is the first 
possible date to launch UCITS compliant absolute return funds, and ends to June 2013. Restricting the 
sample to funds that have reported at least 12 monthly returns, the sample contains 786 ARUs (104 
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 The KIID replaces the “simplified prospectus”. 
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defunct funds) with total assets under management (AUM) of around $230 billion, and 23,204 HFs 
(12,112 defunct funds) with total AUM of around $1,981 billion. Our sample is comprehensive in 
terms of both ARU and HF coverage. A leading absolute return UCITS index provider (ALIX) reports 
that it follows 794 funds as of February 2013. In a report dated that same month, Preqin claims there 
are 701 ARUs in existence. 
It is not a trivial task to merge several commercial hedge fund databases and then identify 
unique hedge funds based on information about multiple share classes. The main reason is that 
commercial data vendors provide an identifier only for unique share classes and not for distinct hedge 
funds. We are able to identify unique hedge funds by way of the merging approach developed in 
Joenväärä, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2014). We match manually UCITS-compliant funds across 
different databases, because of a significant number of currency share classes, it is difficult to identify 
distinct UCITS-compliant funds. Appendix B.1. gives the details of our data gathering process. 
Because ARUs originate in the European Union, our focus is not limited to USD share classes but also 
incorporates funds that include (or deal exclusively with) non-USD share classes.
25
 For such funds we 
convert returns and AuM information into US dollars, using rates obtained from Bloomberg, before 
incorporating them into the analysis. Our consolidated database contains monthly net-of-fees returns, 
AuM, and several additional characteristics; these include manager compensation (management fee, 
performance-based fee, and existence of a high-water mark provision), share restrictions (length of 
lockup, notice, and redemption periods), domicile, currency, category of investment “style”, and date 
of fund inception.  
We focus on comparing absolute return UCITS funds (ARUs) and other hedge funds (HFs). 
According to Panel A in Figure 1, which graphs domiciles of the ARUs in our sample, the majority of 
ARUs are located in Luxembourg and Ireland.
26
 We compare ARUs to other hedge funds, including 
offshore hedge funds, US onshore hedge funds, and other European onshore hedge funds. Panel B of 
Figure 1 breaks down the entire sample of funds (i.e., ARUs plus HFs).
27
 In addition to the distinction 
between ARUs (group 1) and HFs (group 2) that we focus on in most of this paper, one could 
subdivide the group of HFs further into European onshore funds (group 2a), offshore hedge funds such 
                                                 
25
 Our data contains UCITS-compliant funds reported in several currencies (AUD, CHF, EUR, GBP, JPY, NOK, SEK and 
USD) Appendix B.1. provides more details about UCITS share classes. 
26
 Instead of using UCITS structures, a hedge fund manager who targets European investors could also use Irish Qualifying 
Investor Funds (QIFs) and Luxembourg Specialised Investment Funds (SIFs). 
27
 Broadly speaking, these fund types are more flexible than UCITS funds but less flexible than an offshore fund (e.g., a 
Cayman fund). 
 16 
as Cayman funds (group 2b), and onshore US-domiciled hedge funds such as Delaware funds (group 
2c). Investor types differ significantly among these various fund structures. Hedge fund managers use 
offshore vehicles for non-US investors and for non–US-taxable investors but use US onshore funds for 
US-taxable investors. Both ARUs and other UCITS vehicles mainly target retail investors. Hedge fund 
management companies that aim to sell their funds to EU investors can also obtain an authorization 
under the AIFMD, which grants the right to manage alternative investment funds in other EU member 
states and/or to market units in alternative investment funds to professional investors. 
 
[[ Insert Figure 1 about here ]] 
 
 
We classify funds into 11 main categories by investment strategy: CTA (Commodity Trading 
Advisor), Emerging Markets, Event Driven, Global Macro, Long Only, Long/Short Equity, Market 
Neutral, Multi-Strategy, Relative Value, Sector, and Short Bias. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of 
these strategies (and their AuM) across geographic regions. We observe some differences in the 
distribution of ARUs and other hedge funds across investment strategies. Therefore, we control for 
strategy effects carefully while conducting our empirical results. 
 
[[ Insert Figure 2 about here ]] 
 
Table 1 presents the aggregate AuM, number of funds, and attrition rates for both the HF and 
the ARU universe at the end of each calendar year. The reported values show that growth has been 
extremely rapid for the ARU universe over our sample period,
28
 during which aggregate AuM as well 
as the number of funds increased significantly. 
 
[[ Insert Table 1 about here ]] 
 
Table 1 shows that, on average, the attrition rate of HFs is significantly higher than that of 
ARUs; by the end of the sample period, however, the two rates were nearly the same. From 2003 to 
2009, the ARU attrition rate was negligible, so its increase coincided with the 2010–2013 period. 
                                                 
28
 We calculate aggregate hedge fund AuM figures using December observations because the values reported for that month 
are (in the case of hedge funds) widely considered to be the most accurate. 
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Conversations with industry contacts have led us to believe that there are two main reasons why the 
ARU attrition rate is normally low. First, from 2003 onward there were many management companies 
that began to offer alternative ARU funds; hence there are relatively few closed (or defunct) ARU 
funds in the database. Second, and more importantly, it was not until 2009 that the BarclayHedge, 
EurekaHedge, HFR, and Morningstar databases started gathering information on whether or not a 
given fund is UCITS-compliant. Therefore, if a fund moved to the “graveyard” module of a database 
before that year, it did so sans any variable indicating whether or not the fund was UCITS-compliant. 
Later in the sample period, commercial databases did provide UCITS indicator information for active 
funds but not for those funds already in the graveyard. In other words, commercial databases provide 
comprehensive data only for the ARUs that survived.
29
 As a consequence, the average ARU return 
could be biased upward at the beginning of our sample (Fung and Hsieh 2000, 2009; Liang 2000). Our 
results can therefore be viewed as a conservative estimate of the underperformance of ARUs on 
average, which underscores the importance of examining subsamples of the data in light of the 
potential survivorship bias in the data for ARUs. We take that approach and also mitigate backfill bias 
by excluding the first 12 return observations and also excluding tiny funds (i.e., those with less than $5 
million in AuM). 
 
3.2. Differences in Fund-Type Characteristics 
We next examine how fund characteristics differ between ARUs and HFs as well as across hedge fund 
domiciles. On average, we find that HFs are smaller, charge higher fees, and impose tighter share 
restrictions. Among hedge funds, redemption restrictions are tightest for US-domiciled funds and 
loosest for European funds. 
Table 2 reports fund size and age – as well as compensation structure and share restriction 
variables – for both HFs and ARUs. It shows that an average ARU (with a mean size of $246.02 
million) is larger than its average HF peer ($162.98 million). This finding seems counterintuitive until 
one considers that UCITS regulation imposes minimum capital requirements whereas the relatively 
smaller size of most HFs makes them generally much less subject to regulation. Moreover, compliance 
and other fixed costs associated with running a UCITS fund are probably higher than for a non-UCITS 
hedge fund, as indicated by the many small HFs whose economic viability could be jeopardized by 
compliance. Among HFs, US-domiciled funds are smaller than their offshore and European peers. We 
                                                 
29
 Because UCITS hedge funds are a relatively recent development, it is possible that some funds we now classify as UCITS 
would have been classified as non-UCITS in the early part of the sample.  
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define a fund’s age based on the inception date it reports to data vendors. We find that, on average, HFs 
are slightly older (6.31 years) than ARUs (4.82 years). 
 
[[ Insert Table 2 about here ]] 
 
Given that the UCITS format is dominated by mutual funds, we expect that the fees ARUs 
charge will be close to the fees charged by mutual funds and thus lower than those charged by hedge 
funds. We find that the average HF management fee is 1.54%, or somewhat higher than the average 
ARU fee of 1.29%. Hedge funds also charge higher performance-based fees and impose high-water 
mark provisions more often. Indeed, the average HF performance-based fee is 17.66% as compared 
with 12.38% for the average ARU. Hedge funds domiciled in Europe charge lower incentive fees than 
do offshore and US-based funds. Therefore, performance differences between HFs and ARUs could be 
explained in part by the latter’s charging of lower performance-based fees. Theoretical models and 
empirical evidence both suggest that such compensation-structure variables are associated with 
managerial incentives and a greater likelihood of higher gross returns. At the same time, however, 
higher fees should – by construction – also imply lower net (after-fee) returns for investors. 
Regulations stipulate that ARUs provide at least bi-weekly liquidity to investors, so it is not 
surprising to find that HFs impose significantly tighter share restrictions than do ARUs. One fourth of 
HFs impose a lockup period and allow investors only monthly or quarterly redemptions (and with 30 
day advance notice). In sharp contrast, more than half of ARUs provide daily redemptions and impose 
no lockups. 
Among HFs, lockup periods are most frequently imposed by US-based funds, which have the 
strictest redemption terms in general. European onshore HFs impose relatively lighter redemption 
terms than other hedge funds. For instance, whereas Irish QIFs are required to offer at least quarterly 
redemptions, their offshore and US counterparts need not follow such a rule. We are thus motivated to 
investigate how the looser share restrictions of European hedge funds affect their performance. 
 
4. Misvaluation and Operational Risk 
This section is devoted to examining valuation and operational risk differences between ARUs and 
HFs. 
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4.1. Suspicious Patterns in Reported Returns 
We start by comparing differences between ARUs and HFs in terms of suspicious returns. Based on the 
argument of tighter oversight, our Misvaluation Hypothesis posits that ARUs are less likely than HFs 
to manipulate their reported returns. We investigate this issue using a set of so-called red flags, 
proposed by Bollen and Pool (2012), that are designed to detect suspicious patterns in reported fund 
returns.
30
 Those patterns include: (i) a discontinuity in the distribution of hedge fund returns; (ii) two 
measures of low correlation between hedge fund returns and the returns on style factors; and (iii) a 
family of data-quality indicators, such as the percentage of negative returns and the number of exactly 
zero returns. Yet as mentioned previously, it is not straightforward to distinguish between asset 
illiquidity and returns misreporting. With regard to this distinction, Casser and Gerakos (2010) claim 
that asset illiquidity is the main factor driving anomalous properties of self-reported hedge fund 
returns. So that we can improve our ability to distinguish among different interpretations of suspicious 
patterns in returns, we investigate this issue using a large set of proxies for such misreporting. 
Table 3 reports the results. We start by comparing the asset illiquidity of ARUs and HFs. Panel 
A of the table shows the first-order coefficient in a MA(1)-model of fund returns. HFs have 
significantly more autocorrelation than ARUs (0.96 versus 0.26, t = 15.17). This finding is consistent 
with ARUs being required to provide at least bi-weekly redemptions to investors; because HFs can 
impose longer redemption, notice, and lockup periods, they are better positioned to harvest the 
premiums for investing in less liquid assets. Even so, autocorrelation could still be due to misreporting. 
We explore the impact of liquidity on performance in a separate hypothesis below. 
 
[[ Insert Table 3 about here ]] 
 
We next explore the frequency of red flags in fund reported returns. We find that HFs exhibit 
suspicious patterns in reported returns significantly more often than do ARUs. In addition, two 
measures of low correlation between hedge fund returns and the returns on style factors – as well as 
three of our four data-quality indicators – suggest that the patterns of self-reported HF returns are 
comparatively more suspicious. 
Panel B of the table concerns the red flag of a kink. This abnormal rate of reporting small losses 
                                                 
30
 Following Bollen and Pool (2012), we require each fund to have at least 24 return observations over the period from 
January 2003 to June 2013. See Appendix B.2.1. for more details about these red flags. We find very similar results using 
pre-2009 data that do not have any problems in defining whether a fund is UCITS-compliant or not. 
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is significantly higher for hedge funds, which indicates that there is more discontinuity in the returns 
distribution of HFs than of ARUs (0.16 versus 0.11, t = −6.70). However, given Jorion and Schwarz’s 
(2014) demonstration that incentive fees can “mechanistically” create a kink in the net return 
distribution, discontinuities in observed hedge fund return do not conclusively establish that 
manipulation has occurred. 
Nonetheless, our other proxies support the view that HFs manipulate returns more. Panel C of 
Table 3 shows that, as measured by low correlation between either hedge fund returns or the returns of 
style factors, the reported returns of HFs are more suspicious than those of ARUs. Hedge funds have 
significantly larger mean Index R
2
 than ARUs (0.09 vs 0.02, t = 17.47), that is, their returns are less 
explained by their corresponding style index.
31
 Hedge funds have significantly smaller mean Max R
2
 
than ARUs (0.43 vs 0.57, t = −22.15), that is, their returns are less explained by exposure to common 
risk factors.
32
  
Furthermore, Panel D of table reports four measures of data-quality showing that hedge funds 
exhibit more suspicious patterns in reported returns that UCITS funds. We find that hedge funds have 
significantly more repeats (0.03 vs 0.02, t = 6.18), more zero returns (0.38 vs 0.27, t = 3.59), less 
negative returns (0.38 vs 0.42, t = −11.77), and more uniformity of the last digit in reported returns 
(16.81 vs 15.79, t = 4.25) then UCITS-compliant funds. 
In Panel E we combine our measures in reporting the sum total of red flags as well as each 
measure’s first principal component. Both of these metrics indicate that returns patterns are less 
suspicious for UCITS-compliant than for noncompliant funds. 
Finally, we investigate whether the hedge funds’ domiciles are driving the results. For example, 
less regulated offshore HFs might exhibit more return manipulation than other funds. However, 
because we find quantitatively similar results across fund domiciles, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that HFs are more prone than ARUs to return manipulation and that UCITS regulation does protect 
investors.
33
 
 
                                                 
31
 Index R
2
 is the p-value of the slope coefficient from a regression of fund returns on a corresponding equally-weighted 
style index, with higher values denoting more return manipulation. 
32
 Max R
2
 is the maximum adjusted R-square of fund returns against the seven factors of Fung and Hsieh (2004) and the 
four option factors of Agarwal and Naik (2004), with lower values denoting more return manipulation; the optimal factors 
maximizing the adjusted R-square are found via stepwise regression, with a maximum number of factors of six 
33
 Appendix B.1.2. provides the statistical tests for the funds that are domiciled in Europe. 
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4.2. Operational Risk  
As mentioned on several occasions, the primary goals of UCITS regulation include protecting retail 
investors and reducing the risk of funds. Therefore, we next examine whether the regulation succeeds 
in this endevour and whether measures of operational risk are, as anticipated, lower for ARUs than for 
HFs. Contrary to the prediction of our Operational Risk Hypothesis, we find evidence that ARUs are 
not less exposed to operational risk – and also tend to have more potential conflicts of interest – 
than HFs. 
 
4.2.1. Past Violations and Conflict of Interest 
Similar to Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008, 2009), we construct two measures of 
operational risk – problem indicator and Omega score.34 We start by classifying as “problem” funds 
those that answered Yes to at least one question in Item 11 of their Form ADV filing. Item 11 requires 
filers to identify any problems exhibited by fund management or its advisory affiliates: felonies; 
investment-related misdemeanors; any agency, SEC, Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), or self-regulatory issues; and pending disciplinary actions or civil lawsuits. The problem 
indicator is only available for those funds that file Form ADV. To address this issue, we estimate 
Omega score for each fund by defining it as the fitted value from a Probit model of the problem 
indicator against a number of fund characteristics.
35
 In other words, Omega score predicts the problem 
indicator, but is applicable to all funds, not just those registered with SEC. 
Surprisingly, Panel A of Table 4 shows that a larger proportion of ARUs are problem funds 
than is the case for HFs. In addition, we find that Omega-scores tend to be significantly higher for 
ARUs than for HFs. This finding suggests that ARUs are more exposed than HFs to operational risk. 
One caveat is that not all EU-based funds file a Form ADV with the US-based regulator (i.e., the SEC). 
However, there is no statistical difference between ARUs and HFs in ADV-filing (0.24 vs 0.26, t = 
−1.47). Observe that we are comparing EU-domiciled funds (including ARUs and other non-UCITS 
onshore hedge funds domiciled in Europe) with offshore and US hedge funds; as a result, the 
conclusions are more nuanced. We find both a larger portion of problem funds and a higher level of 
                                                 
34
 Appendix B.2. gives the details how operational risk measures are constructed. 
35
 The other possible Omega’s definition would be the canonical correlation of fund characteristics against Form ADV 
variables, which leads very similar conclusions. Similar to Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008, 2009, 2012), we 
use as fund characteristic; fund age, fund size, management fee, incentive fee, high-water mark, notice period, lockup 
dummy, leverage dummy,  as well as  average return and standard deviation of fund return based on a 12-month rolling 
window. 
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operational risk for EU-domiciled funds than for other funds. 
 
[[ Insert Table 4 about here ]] 
 
 Toward the end of better understanding the sources of operational risk, we present a set of 
proxies for potential external and the internal conflicts of interest. We adopt a univariate setting and 
focus initially on external relationships between the fund and other entities that represent potential 
conflicts of interest. The first four data columns in Panel B of Table 4 report the frequencies of 
responses to questions such as whether the manager has a related broker/dealer, commodities broker, 
investment adviser, bank or insurance company and whether the manager is the sponsor of a limited 
liability partnership (LLP). Again, we find clear evidence that ARUs have answered Yes to these 
questions more often than HFs have. Out of 6 questions, a typical ARU (resp., HF) gave 2.54 (resp., 
1.85) Yes answers. This finding is confirmed by construction the first principal component of external 
conflicts of interest. Just as we concluded from the evidence in Panel A, in this case also we find that 
geographical location matters. In other words, there are more determining factors than simply whether 
or not the focal fund is UCITS-compliant. The last three columns of Panel B show that European hedge 
funds have more potential external conflicts than do offshore and US-based funds. The most interesting 
difference is that both ARUs and European HFs are more likely than other funds to have connections 
with particular banks and brokers. 
Panel C of Table 4 reports differences among fund types in terms of various proxies for 
possible internal conflicts of interest. Consistent with the findings already reported, ARUs (on average) 
answered Yes to questions addressing internal conflicts of interest more frequently than did HFs; the 
implication is that ARUs exhibit more internal conflicts. Although these results are less clear-cut than 
those for external conflicts of interest, the total frequency of internal conflicts (see Panel D) is still 
higher for ARUs than for HFs – a result that is statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding is 
apparently driven by the RecSalesInterest and OtherResearch variables, which suggests that ARUs 
have more conflicts with related parties that have a sales interest in recommending securities. In 
addition, external research is more often employed by ARUs than by HFs.
36
 
 
[[ Insert Table 5 about here ]] 
                                                 
36
 In unreported results we find no statistically significant differences in conflicts of interest between ARUs (first data 
column in all Table 4 panels) and a subset of European onshore funds – namely, QIFs and SIFs (fifth data column). 
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4.2.2. Probit Model Analysis on the Past Violations 
Finally, we examine whether the UCITS structure is related to past violations in a multivariate setting. 
After controlling for various conflicts of interest, we estimate a multivariate Probit model in which the 
dependent variable indicates whether or not the focal fund has had a past violations (i.e., “problems”). 
 We address potential sample selection bias using the Heckman (1979) method. It may be the case 
that not all EU-based funds file a Form ADV with the US-based regulator (i.e., the SEC). An important 
identification assumption in Heckman’s correction is that there are some variables that explain the 
fund’s selection to file Form ADV, but these variables do not explain the fund’s past violations. As an 
exclusion restriction, we employ a set of fund characteristics (fund age, fund size, management fee, 
incentive fee, high-water mark, notice period, lockup dummy, leverage dummy, as well as average 
return and standard deviation of fund return based on a 12-month rolling window). As we see from 
Table 2, fund characteristics for funds domiciled in US and Europe tend to be significantly different 
between domiciles. In addition, the Probit model analysis on the problem variable conducted by 
Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008) show that fund size, high-water mark and average 
returns do not explain past violations (See, their Table III). Hence, as an appropriate first stage 
selection model, we regress (Probit) an ADV indicator (equal to whether the fund's advisor has a Form 
ADV report as of June 2013) against fund characteristics discussed above. To save space, we report the 
results in Appendix B.2.2. The inverse Mills ratio of the fitted probability from this Probit regression 
constitutes the fund's λ measure, which is a proxy for the fund's propensity for filing Form ADV. 
 Table 5 reports the results for the second stage Heckman equation, where the inverse Mills’s ratio 
(i.e., Heckman’s lambda) is used for addressing sample selection bias. As a baseline, the first two data 
columns report Probit model results in which the independent variables exclude the indicators for 
conflict of interest and only add a variable that captures the first principal component of Bollen and 
Pool’s (2012) red flags. At first it appears that ARUs are more likely than HRs to have had (or be 
having) problems. Yet when we add control variables for conflicts of interest, we find that the ARU 
variable becomes insignificant. As it turns out, the higher probability of being a problem fund is instead 
strongly (indeed, significantly) associated with having a related broker-dealer – and also with other 
conflict-of-interest indicators. Hence, we can conclude that the fund’s UCITS structure itself is not a 
primary reason for past violations. However, both our univariate and multivariate analyses suggest that 
UCITS-compliant funds do not have lower operational risk measures compared to their less regulated 
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hedge fund counterparts.   
 
5. Performance Hypothesis and Risk Hypothesis 
To address our Performance and Fund Risk Hypotheses, we use portfolio sorts and fund-level measures 
as well as multivariate regressions with Heckman correction to show that our results are robust.    
 
5.1. Portfolio Sorts 
In Section 2 we noted that the UCITS directive imposes a range of restrictions on eligible assets and 
permitted strategies which can be expected to adversely affect the investment opportunity set and risk-
adjusted performance of ARUs compared to other hedge funds. In order to evaluate the overall 
performance of funds, we construct equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) portfolios over the 
sample period from January 2005 to June 2013. We exclude the first two years from the analysis 
because there are only very few UCITS-compliant funds and issues related to survivorship bias as 
discussed earlier. 
To evaluate fund performance, we augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with emerging 
market and currency factors because of the potentially global geographical exposure of ARUs (See 
Panel B of Figure 2). As factors, we use the excess return on the S&P 500 index (SP), the return on the 
Russell 2000 index minus the return on the S&P 500 index (SIZE), the excess return on 10‐year 
Treasuries (CGS10), the return on Moody’s BAA corporate bonds minus that on 10‐year Treasuries 
(CREDSPR), the excess returns on look‐back straddles using bonds (PTFSBD), currencies (PTFSFX), 
and commodities (PTFSCOM), and the MSCI Emerging Market index (MSEMKF); the currency risk 
factor is constructed following Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011).
37
 Use of the currency risk 
factor is motivated by Banegas, Gillen, Timmermann, and Wermers (2013), who document its 
importance when evaluating how well European mutual funds perform. 
Panel A of Table 6 presents both risk-adjusted performance measures and systematic risk 
loadings for EW portfolios consisting solely of ARUs or HFs.
38
 We find that, during the 2005–2013 
sample period, ARUs had negative risk-adjusted performance (alpha of −1.061% per year) whereas 
                                                 
37
 We obtain data for the three equity market–related factors (SP, SIZE, and MSEMKF) from Datastream and for the two 
bond factors (CGS10 and CREDSPR) from the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 reports. Data for the three primitive trend-
following factors (PTFSBD, PTFSFX, and PTFSCOM) are downloaded from David Hsieh’s Web page and the currency 
risk factor is downloaded from Adrien Verdelhan’s Web page. 
38
 Throughout the whole paper, we mitigate backfill bias by excluding the first 12 return observations and also very small 
funds (AuM < $5 million). Unreported results are quantitatively similar when we use the Getmansky, Makarov, and Lo 
(2004) technique to unsmooth fund returns. 
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HFs had positive risk-adjusted performance (alpha of +1.176% per year). It is worth noting that the 
difference in risk-adjusted performance between these two groups is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This result is robust to using VW portfolios, as shown in Panel B of the table. Hence, differences 
in fund size distributions (see Panel C of Figure 2) between ARUs and HFs are unlikely to drive 
performance results. 
We next test the Risk Hypothesis formulated in Section 2 which states that ARUs have lower 
market risk loadings due to UCITS’ value-at-risk and leverage restrictions as well as other risk 
management requirements.  We find that the exposure to the stock market risk is significantly higher 
for UCITS-compliant funds than hedge funds.
39
  Thus, using portfolio sorts we find support for the 
Fund Performance but not for the Risk Hypothesis.  
 
[[ Insert Table 6 about here ]] 
5. 2 Fund-level Measures 
Now we test both the Performance and Risk Hypothesis using fund-level measures. In doing so 
we estimate all fund-level measures for each individual fund that has at least 24 return observations 
using the Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) technique for unsmoothed returns, which corrects for 
artificially smooth returns that could be the result of misreporting or illiquidity. We take the cross-
sectional median for each measure and test the difference between HFs and ARUs.
40
 To address 
potential survivorship bias in ARU returns, in Panels C and D of Table 6 we examine two subsamples: 
from January 2005 to December 2009 and from January 2010 to June 2013. It could be that issue 
related to survivorship bias rendered the median difference for average returns and Sharpe ratios 
statistically insignificant during the earlier period; during the later period, however, these medians are 
significantly higher for HFs. 
Panels C and D show that HFs exhibit better risk-adjusted performance and lower risk than do 
ARUs – especially during the later period, when there are no problems stemming from attrition rates.41 
                                                 
39
 We find similar results once we run tests after correcting for autocorrelation using Getmansky, Makarov and Lo (2004) 
approach.  
40
 The conclusions are not changed if we instead use mean tests. As a baseline, we report medians because they are more 
robust with regard to outliers. 
41
 In Appendix, we find that are conclusions are not sensitive to the benchmark model. To confirm this issue, following 
Titman and Tiu (2011) we use 26 risk factors in a stepwise regression model to estimate alphas and risk loadings more 
precisely. The factors used are the augmented Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors, four US Carhart factors, four Global Carhart 
factors, four European Carhart factors, two Agarwal–Naik option factors (Call_OTM and Put_OTM), the Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity risk factor, the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting-against-beta factor, and the Asness, 
Frazzini, and Pedersen (2013) “quality minus junk” factor. 
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The qualitative conclusions are not sensitive to whether we use standard measures or other, more 
sophisticated metrics that account not only for potential performance manipulation and nonlinearities in 
fund returns but also for omitted risk factors in those returns. Restrictions on the use of derivatives, 
together with other impediments to implementing hedge fund–like strategies, may help explain the 
worse performance and higher risk of ARUs. 
Neither performance measure manipulation nor nonlinearities in hedge fund returns can explain 
why HFs are less risky than ARUs. According to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2007), 
standard performance measures (e.g., alpha and the Sharpe ratio) can be “gamed” by means of time-
varying leverage and certain option strategies that are more often used by HFs. We therefore compare 
manipulation-proof performance measures (MPPMs) between HFs and ARUs. These measures are 
significantly higher for HFs, which suggests that HFs do not outperform ARUs by engaging in 
“information-less” option strategies. 
Also, using fund-level measures, we do not find support for the Risk Hypothesis. Contrary to 
the hypothesis, we find that median volatility and expected shortfall are actually greater for ARUs.
42
 
To understand the sources of these differences in risk further, we estimate measures of both systematic 
and idiosyncratic risk for HFs and ARUs. We find that the median of the composite systematic risk 
measure of Bali, Brown and Caylayan (2012) is greater for ARUs than HFs. We also measure 
systematic risk in terms of R² with respect to the 9-factor model (Titman and Tiu 2011). Our findings 
suggest that R²-values are significantly higher for ARUs than for HFs, which means that ARU returns 
are less countercyclical than HF returns. This result is consistent with the hurdles encountered when 
transporting hedge fund techniques to the UCITS universe. Because UCITS funds face restrictions 
regarding the use of derivatives and short-selling, their consequent reduced flexibility may well make 
ARU returns less countercyclical than those of HFs. Our results therefore suggest that, even though 
UCITS regulation puts strong emphasis on protecting investors from market risk, hedge funds that are 
less regulated seem to have internal controls that discourage them from taking excessive risk. 
In univariate tests, fund-level alphas cross-sectional averages are assumed to be independent. 
Next, we relax this assumption by means of multivariate regressions. 
 
                                                 
42
 The results are quantitatively similar when we measure HF and ARU tail risk by instead using maximum drawdown as 
estimated via the geometric cumulative returns. 
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5.3. Multivariate Regression Analysis 
We conduct multivariate regressions to investigate whether differences in redemption terms, fund size, 
and age – or whether proxies for managerial incentives – explain the observed performance differences 
between HFs and ARUs. 
We first estimate monthly augmented Fung and Hsieh (2004) alphas for each of the individual 
funds with at least 24 return observations.
43
  We then run multivariate regressions in which alphas are 
explained by the UCITS indicator variable and a set of fund characteristics that have been found (in the 
literature) to account for fund performance differences. The following panel regressions are estimated 
over the period from January 2005 to June 2013: 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐴𝑅𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Here 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 denotes the augmented Fung and Hsieh (2004) alpha of a hedge fund i at time t; 𝐴𝑅𝑈𝑖,𝑡 
is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if fund i is UCITS-compliant (and set to 0 otherwise); and 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are fund i’s share restrictions in the form of minimum investment requirements and its 
lockup and restriction periods. The 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 term incorporates fund i’s management and 
incentive fees, high-water mark provision (if any), and time-variant characteristics that control for fund 
size, flow, and age; the importance of these latter factors has been demonstrated by Aggarwal and 
Jorion (2010) and by Teo (2010, 2011). 
 
[[ Insert Table 7 about here ]] 
 
Overall, the results presented in Table 7 confirm that ARUs have lower risk-adjusted returns than HFs 
even when control variables are included. The economic magnitude of risk-adjusted return difference 
between ARUs and HFs is significant, being 1.44% per annum. This suggests that regulation impacts 
indirectly on investment funds.  
To address potential sample selection bias that may arise from the fact that the fund’s legal 
structure choice may not be exogenous, we follow the recent hedge fund literature (Ramadorai 2012, 
2013 and Teo 2011) and employ the Heckman (1979) two stage-procedure to correct for possible 
sample selection bias. An important identification assumption in Heckman’s correction is that there are 
some variables that explain the fund’s selection to be structured as UCITS-compliant, but these 
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 We use the Getmansky, Makarov, and Lo (2004) technique to unsmooth fund returns. 
 28 
variables do not explain the fund’s risk-adjusted returns. If there is no such exclusion restriction, the 
regression model is identified only by distributional assumptions about the residuals, which could lead 
to problems in estimating the parameters of the model. As an exclusion restriction, we employ fund 
family size at inception. This variable is also used by Teo (2011). It is also particularly well-suited for 
us, because the fund’s legal structure could be linked to variables known at inception. For larger fund 
families, it would be easier to absorb to compliance costs and minimum capital requirements. As Teo 
(2011) argues, at the same time, it is very unlikely that the family size at inception significantly 
impacts on fund performance several months after the inception. We also use management fee and 
incentive fee as additional variables in selection equation reported in Columns 4 and 5. We find that all 
of these three variables are highly significant. Larger fund families have higher propensity to set up 
UCITS-compliant funds as we expected. Both management fees and incentive fees are lower for 
UCITS-compliant funds compared to hedge funds. In Columns 6 and 7, we report results for the 
regression equation. We find that even after the selection bias correction that the coefficient for ARU 
indicator is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the selection bias does not drive our 
findings. 
We next focus on the role of control variables. Regulation of remuneration policies has been a 
focal point after the financial crisis. We find that managerial incentives are important drivers of cross-
sectional performance differences between funds. According to a recent Financial Times article:  
US fund groups have rapidly expanded into Ucits funds in recent years as a way of 
accessing both the European and Asian markets. More than 1,000 such funds, with assets of 
€765bn, are now domiciled in Ireland alone . . . . However, “the US managers that have set 
up Ucits funds are extremely exercised” about proposals from the European Parliament’s 
economic and monetary affairs committee to limit asset managers’ bonuses to 100 per cent 
of their salary.
 44
 
The above extract raises the question of what the effect of remuneration restrictions would be on ARUs 
and to our knowledge this question has not been previously studied in the literature. We use our data to 
address this question. The ARUs funds in our sample operate without regulatory restrictions on 
remuneration and are free to set their fee and compensation structures. We find that performance 
increases with incentive fees and so, if UCITS-compliant funds were forced by regulators to implement 
bonus caps, the likely effect would be to drive an additional wedge between the (average) performance 
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 Steve Johnson, “EU pay cap a concern for US funds,” Financial Times, 24 March 2013. 
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of ARUs and HFs. Of course, such regulatory behavior would also have welfare implications for 
pension funds that invest in alternative investment funds. We leave the analysis of such consequences 
to future work. 
To sum up, we find strong support for the Fund Performance Hypothesis stating that hedge 
funds deliver higher risk-adjusted returns compared to UCITS-compliant funds. In contrast, we reject 
the Risk Hypothesis, because our results suggest that ARUs are riskier than HFs. We find that ARUs 
are more exposed to systemic risk even after adjusting for autocorrelation in fund returns.  
 
6. Liquidity Restriction Hypothesis 
 
In this section we examine our Liquidity Restriction Hypothesis by investigating the effects of 
redemption restrictions and leverage limits on fund performance; in doing so, we shed some light on 
the economic mechanism that enables funds with strict redemption restrictions to generate high 
performance nonetheless. Finally, we identify and compare the most closely matched pair of ARU and 
non-UCITS hedge funds within a given management company and under the same fund manager. This 
allows us to measure effect of liquidity restrictions when the fund skill is fixed. 
 
6.1. Liquidity-Performance trade-off 
The preceding performance comparison may not be fair, given that ARUs and HFs have very different 
liquidity terms and share restrictions. So that we will not be comparing apples and oranges, we 
examine the Liquidity Restriction Hypothesis.   
 The UCITS regulations stipulate that Absolute Return UCITS must offer at least bi-weekly 
redemptions to investors. We divide HFs into three groups based on the restriction period (defined as 
the sum of redemption and notice periods), and we then test whether “liquid” and “illiquid” HFs differ 
from ARUs in terms of performance. We use the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting-against-beta 
(BaB) factor and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity risk (PS) factor to test effects related to 
leverage constraints and liquidity risk.
45
 To adjust for potential domicile effects, we compare ARUs 
against other non-UCITS funds that are domiciled in Europe; note that EU-domiciled hedge funds 
                                                 
45
 Betting-against-beta factor from Andrea Frazzini’s Web page; liquidity risk factor from Lubos Pastor’s Web page. 
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typically impose longer redemption and notice periods.
46
 
Panel A of Table 8 shows that the risk-adjusted average performance of ARUs converges with 
that of liquid HFs when we compare liquidity-matched portfolios. Both 9-factor and 11-factor alphas 
are statistically indistinguishable for ARUs and HFs that provide at least bi-weekly liquidity. 
 
[[ Insert Table 8 about here ]] 
 
Panel B of the table documents that European onshore funds exhibit significant risk-adjusted 
returns and liquidity trade-off. Funds with long redemption periods outperform those with short 
periods, a dynamic that is at least partly explained by the former’s monotonic exposure to both the BaB 
and PS factors. This finding is partly driven by the importance of leverage constraints and liquidity 
risk, as is shown by our results for the 11-factor model. We find that exposure to the Frazzini and 
Pedersen (2014) betting-against-beta factor is highest (resp., lowest) for funds with the longest (resp., 
shortest) restriction periods. In results not reported here, we also find evidence that this relationship is 
monotonic in terms of the Patton and Timmermann (2010) monotonicity test. The 11-factor alpha, 
which includes the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) factors, is lower 
than the 9-factor alpha – especially for funds with tight restrictions. We are thus led to investigate 
whether or not illiquid European onshore funds outperform ARUs. 
Panel C in Table 8 reports rather different results for illiquid versus liquid HFs, since both 9- 
and 11-factor alphas are significantly higher for illiquid HFs than for ARUs. Hedge funds that provide 
the strictest redemption terms deliver the best performance, whereas funds that guarantee investors the 
possibility of redeeming on at least a bi-weekly basis deliver the lowest performance. This implies that 
the indirect cost of UCITS rules is in terms of risk-adjusted performance difference from 2.57% to 
3.05% per annum. 
In sum, leverage constraints and liquidity risk mark important differences between illiquid and 
liquid funds but do not indicate differences in their loadings on market liquidity risk. We emphasize 
that only for illiquid HFs do we find a positive and statistically significant loading on the BaB factor, 
and we find no evidence that liquidity risk is greater for illiquid HFs than for ARUs. Thus the evidence 
suggests that leverage constraints may be less binding for hedge funds imposing long restriction 
periods. 
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 The liquidity–performance trade-off results hold for other hedge funds domiciled offshore or in the United States; these 
results are not documented here (owing to space limitations) but are available from the authors upon request. 
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6.2. Comparing UCITS and Non-UCITS Pairs Managed by the Same Firm or Fund Manager 
Selection bias is an important concern when comparing ARUs and other HFs. We previous section 
used the Heckman (1979) correction to show that our results are robust to selection bias. An alternative 
approach to addressing selection bias – yet one that is also not sensitive to the specific model used in 
the first stage of the Heckman correction – is to compare funds only from management companies that 
feature comparable UCITS and non-UCITS funds. Recall from Section 1 that many hedge fund 
management companies now offer UCITS-compliant funds not only for “offshore” hedge funds but 
also for pure hedge funds. We therefore match, within a given management company, the closest 
possible UCITS and non-UCITS share class pairs. We gather from the EurekaHedge database 276 side-
by-side management cases involving 138 UCITS-compliant funds and 164 hedge funds. 
First, we run the regression within firms that manage both UCITS and non-UCITS funds. Our 
aim is to identify fund-specific characteristics that drive the performance difference between the focal 
firm’s UCITS and non-UCITS funds, and the two leading candidates are liquidity and leverage. The 
capacity of HFs to impose tighter share restrictions may help them manage capital flows more 
efficiently and thereby facilitate their implementation of arbitrage strategies with longer-term horizons. 
Regulations limit the ability of UCITS-compliant funds to exploit leverage, whereas hedge funds can 
be relatively more leveraged. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) point out that, although UCITS funds 
encounter more leverage constraints, hedge funds typically face margin calls during times of financial 
stress. 
To address these issues, we run the following panel regression within management companies 
that manage both types of funds or manage simultaneously UCITS-compliant funds and hedge funds: 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝐻𝐹 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝑈𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑆 = γ0 + γ1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + γ2Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + γ3Δ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ε, 
where the left-hand side is to the return difference between the closest possible UCITS-compliant and 
noncompliant fund pair offered by the focal management company.
47
 In Panel A, we restrict the sample 
to pairs coming from the same management company, while Panel B reports the results for managers 
that simultaneously manage UCITS-compliant funds and hedge funds. The term Restriction dummy 
gets a value of 0 if both of the funds in a pair provide at least bi-weekly liquidity and 1 if the hedge 
fund’s restriction period is longer than two weeks; ΔLeverage is the difference between the average 
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 The regression model framework we use closely follows that of Cao, Farnsworth, Liang, and Lo (2013), who examine the 
difference in returns between a hedge fund and its Separate Account Platform share class. 
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leverage of the hedge fund and that of the UCITS pair; and ΔControls is the difference between hedge 
funds and UCITS share classes for the set of control variables defined previously in Table 7. Finally, 
we control for strategy and time fixed effects and, following Petersen (2009), adjust standard errors 
within firm-level cluster correlation. 
Panel A of Table 9 reports the results for companies that manage both hedge funds and UCITS 
funds. There is evidence that share and leverage restrictions are driving the difference between UCITS 
and non-UCITS share classes. We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for differences 
in the restriction dummy, which means that hedge funds should outperform their UCITS counterparts 
that have shorter restriction periods. The economic magnitude of performance difference is large, being 
1.80% - 2.16% per annum. We also find evidence that the level of leverage matters. 
 
[[ Insert Table 9 about here ]] 
 
Panel B of the table presents a test in which we control for the selectivity bias associated with 
the fund manager’s ability. The concern is that management companies put their best managers to 
hedge funds because of the possibility to earn higher fees. Using a sample of individuals who manage 
both UCITS and non-UCITS fund, we investigate the effect of regulatory constraints on fund 
performance so that we can control for fund manager skill; this procedure should yield cleaner 
estimates of such regulatory constraints as share restrictions and leverage limits, because they are not 
contaminated due to selectivity bias. Using a sample obtained from the EurekaHedge database, we 
repeat the analysis from Panel A but now for pairs of comparable funds run by the same manager (not 
the same management company). The results, which are reported in Panel B, support our earlier 
conclusions. We find a positive and significant coefficient for the restriction dummy and also for 
leverage differences. Hence these results support our Liquidity Restriction Hypothesis even after we 
control for the role of firm-level effects and fund manager skill. 
 
7. Performance Persistence Hypothesis 
 
Our Persistence Hypothesis in Section 2 states that ARUs should exhibit less performance persistence 
than other HFs because the latter’s trading strategies are more secretive. However, exploiting any 
performance persistence in hedge funds may be hampered by various share restrictions. Hedge funds 
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normally restrict capital withdrawals by imposing lockup, advance notice, and redemption periods. 
Such restrictions prevent investors from withdrawing capital from hedge funds in a timely fashion. In 
contrast, ARUs are required to provide investors with at least bi-weekly liquidity. Thus real-world HF 
investors may be unable to exploit any short-term performance persistence even as ARU investors can 
frequently rebalance their portfolios. It is worth noting, however, that a significant proportion of HFs 
do provide rebalancing options similar to those available for ARUs. We are therefore interested in 
examining whether redemption restrictions hamper the exploitation by investors of short-term 
performance persistence. 
Glode and Green (2011) explain the performance persistence of hedge funds by showing that it 
could reflect a desire for secrecy. As mentioned previously, these authors point out that superior returns 
may be due only partly to manager ability; such returns might also be attributable to strategies or 
techniques that could be expropriated and exploited by informed others. Arguments like this are 
consistent with a competitive economy’s “zero-profit” condition, under which enough money chasing a 
given pattern in returns will necessarily eliminate that pattern. Therefore, our Performance Persistence 
Hypothesis predicts that the performance of HFs will be more persistent than that of ARUs. 
We use a standard methodology to compare the performance persistence of HFs and ARUs. In 
the spirit of Carhart (1997), we sort funds into quintile portfolios based on their past (9-factor alpha) t-
statistics, which are estimated over the prior two years’ data. The alpha t-statistic’s superior predictive 
power is such that we expect it to reveal greater performance persistence than would a simple sort by 
fund alpha.
48
 We use different portfolio rebalancing periods that range from a month to a year in 
length, and we calculate returns for each of the quintile portfolios across these rebalancing horizons.
49
 
Then we estimate the alpha spread between the top- and bottom-quintile portfolios. 
 
[[ Insert Figure 3 about here ]] 
 
Figure 3 plots results, across the rebalancing horizons, from our tests for performance 
persistence. We find that, whereas HF performance persists, ARUs do not deliver long-term 
performance persistence. This evidence is supportive of the Persistence Hypothesis. Our findings also 
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 Funds with a short history of monthly net returns will tend to generate alphas that are outliers. The alpha t-statistic 
corrects for outliers by normalizing the fund alpha in terms of its estimated precision (Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, 
and White 2006; Kosowski, Naik, and Teo 2007). 
49
 The portfolios are equal-weighted monthly, so weights are re-adjusted whenever a fund disappears. 
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suggest that, although HFs providing at least bi-weekly liquidity exhibit considerable performance 
persistence during the sample period, HFs that impose a lockup period as well as notice and 
redemption periods exceeding 30 days do not deliver significant performance persistence on an annual 
basis.
50
 
 
[[ Insert Figure 4 about here ]] 
 
Given that all ARUs and some HFs allow investors the option of redeeming their capital in a 
timely fashion, we conduct some performance persistence tests. For this purpose, we form out-of-
sample strategies by using an alpha t-statistic that is lagged by one month; this procedure reflects the 
capacity of a real-time investor to rebalance her portfolio. The results of these tests are graphed in 
Figure 4, which shows significant performance persistence for (liquid) HFs but none for ARUs. In 
short: HF performance persists, but ARUs cannot deliver significant performance persistence even at 
monthly horizons. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper contributes on the literature on the effect of regulation, geography and liquidity on asset 
price performance and welfare by documenting the effect of geographically disparate hedge fund 
regulation on fund performance. Based on regulatory constraints, such as reporting and risk 
management requirements, constraints on the investment opportunity set, requirements and share 
restrictions, we economically motivate and test a range of hypotheses regarding differences in 
performance and risk between Absolute Return UCITS (ARUs) and hedge funds. On the one hand, we 
find strong support for our Misvaluation Hypothesis since ARUs funds exhibit significantly less 
suspicious return patterns. One the other hand, we do not find support for the Operational Risk 
Hypothesis since ARUs funds have higher operational risk metrics than hedge funds. Restrictions on 
the investment opportunity set seem to have economically significant impact on risk-adjusted 
performance, since consistent with the Performance Hypothesis we find robust evidence of lower risk-
adjusted performance for ARUs than hedge funds. Despite the UCITS directives focus on risk 
management it seems that restrictions on derivatives and short-selling have a material impact on fund 
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 Appendix Tables B5 and B6 report the statistical differences for alphas as well as a wide range of other performance 
measures. 
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risk, since in the context of the Risk Hypothesis, we find that hedge funds generally exhibit lower 
volatility and less tail risk than do ARUs, which is consistent with the difficulty of porting the risk 
management techniques of hedge funds to the ARU domain. In the context of our tests of the Liquidity 
Restrictions hypothesis, we uncover a strong performance-liquidity tradeoff. Although ARUs 
underperform other hedge funds on average, comparing ARU and HF groups that are liquidity-matched 
(in terms of share restrictions) shows that the performance of these two fund types converges. Finally, 
in our tests of the Persistence Hypothesis, we establish that there are limits to the ability of an investor 
to exploit the superior liquidity of ARUs because they exhibit less performance persistence than do 
some hedge funds. 
There are two additional reasons why UCITS and ARUs are likely to attract the attention of 
researchers. First, both fund universes are growing rapidly and have become of increasing economic 
importance. Second, the latest UCITS rules impose remuneration caps on managers of UCITS funds, 
including UCITS hedge funds, and these rules can be expected to affect fund performance. 
An interesting area for future research would be to examine the performance of US ’40 Act 
funds and compare them to a matched sample of similar funds within the same management company. 
Domicile effects also warrant additional research, and we remark that the subsample of QIFs and SIFs 
domiciled in (respectively) Luxembourg and Ireland face restrictions that are less stringent than those 
of UCITS yet are more stringent than those typically governing offshore funds. Comparing the 
performance of QIF and SIF funds with other hedge funds would illuminate the effect of domicile on 
performance and risk. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of funds across fund domiciles 
 
This pie graph shows the fund domicile distribution of the absolute returns on UCITS funds (Panel A) and on all 
funds (Panel B) as of June 2013. 
 
Panel A: Absolute returns on UCITS funds 
 
 
 
Panel B: Absolute returns on all funds 
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Figure 2. Summary Statistics 
 
This bar graph illustrates the strategy distribution (Panel A), AuM invested in geographic regions (Panel B), and 
fund size distribution (Panel C) across fund domiciles. 
 
Panel A: Investment strategy distribution across fund domiciles 
 
 
 
Panel B: Proportion of AuM invested in geographic regions 
 
 
 
Panel C: Fund size distribution across fund domiciles 
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Figure 3. Performance persistence differences between ARUs and HFs 
 
This figure plots the (annualized) 9-factor Fung–Hsieh (FH) alphas for the ARUs and HFs. It displays the top and bottom quintile alphas across 
rebalancing frequencies. Using t-statistics of the nine-factor FH alpha, funds are sorted into quintile portfolios that are rebalanced at 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 
and 12 months frequencies. The t-statistics are estimated using the 24 most recent return observations. 
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Figure 4. Feasibility and Performance Persistence 
 
This figure plots the (annualized) 9-factor FH alphas for the ARUs and HFs. We control for Figures displays the top and bottom quintile alphas 
across rebalancing frequencies. Using t-statistics of the nine-factor FH alpha, funds are sorted into quintile portfolios that are rebalanced at 1, 2, 3, 
4, 6 and 12 months frequencies. The t-statistics are estimated using the 24 most recent return observations. 
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Table 1: Capital formation of Hedge Funds and Absolute Return UCITS 
 
This table presents the capital formation process of hedge funds and Absolute Return UCITS from December 
2003 to December 2012. N is the number of funds in given year. ‘AuM’ provides aggregate assets under 
management for Hedge Funds and Absolute Return UCITS. ‘Attrition rate’ is the percentage of funds that 
became inactive during the year. 
 
 
 
Hedge Funds 
 
Absolute Return UCITS 
Year 
 
N AuM Attrition rate 
 
N AuM Attrition Rate 
2003 
 
10,081 895,585 5.2 
 
144 5,835 0 
2004 
 
11,991 1,344,230 5.9 
 
180 11,365 0 
2005 
 
13,621 1,599,562 7.8 
 
229 22,301 0 
2006 
 
14,972 2,119,883 9.1 
 
301 48,216 0.7 
2007 
 
15,891 2,666,225 10.6 
 
381 62,941 0.8 
2008 
 
15,190 1,832,842 17.1 
 
466 38,298 1.7 
2009 
 
14,936 1,828,022 13.0 
 
618 78,892 1.1 
2010 
 
14,801 1,992,104 12.5 
 
801 137,382 3.7 
2011 
 
14,403 2,028,704 12.9 
 
878 177,347 8.6 
2012 
 
13,044 1,981,433 16.1 
 
854 226,485 12.0 
 
 
  
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Fund Characteristics 
The right hand-side of this table presents the summary statistics for fund size and age as well as compensation and share restrictions variables of 
Hedge Funds (HF) and Absolute Return UCITS (ARU). The left hand-side presents fund characteristics across hedge fund domicile. The table 
presents cross-sectional difference tests for each fund characteristics. ‘Size’ denotes the fund’s size in millions of US dollars. ‘Age’ denotes the 
fund’s age in years based on the fund inception data. ‘Management Fee’ shows the management fee within a specific category. ‘Incentive Fee’ 
denotes the performance-based fee that fund charges. ‘High-water Mark’ indicates whether a fund imposes a high-water mark provision. 
’Redemption’ denotes redemption frequency. ‘Notice’ is the advance notice period. ‘Restriction’ is the sum of redemption and notice periods. 
‘Lockup’ denotes the length of period when investors are restricted to withdraw their initial investment. ‘Lockup Dummy’ denotes the proportion 
of funds imposing a lockup period. ‘Minimum Investment' is the fund's minimum subscription amount in US dollars. ‘Leverage Dummy’ reports 
to proportion of funds that use leverage. ‘Average Leverage ‘is the amount of average leverage. 
 
 
Mean difference between ARUs and HFs 
 
Hedge Fund Domicile 
 
ARU HF Diff t-statistic 
 
Europe Offshore USA 
Size 246.02 162.98 83.04 3.15 
 
194.84 202.02 129.76 
Age 4.82 6.31 -1.49 -10.28 
 
5.22 6.54 7.38 
         Management Fee 1.29 1.54 -0.24 -13.35 
 
1.50 1.59 1.51 
Incentive Fee 12.38 17.66 -5.29 -19.99 
 
14.86 18.10 18.81 
High-water Mark 0.6 0.72 -0.11 -7.73 
 
0.59 0.82 0.69 
         Redemption 2.3 57.76 -55.45 -122.33 
 
24.32 49.22 87.60 
Notice 1.42 30.85 -29.43 -143.47 
 
13.00 36.38 33.49 
Lockup 0 89.23 -89.23 -77.27 
 
21.14 70.17 151.86 
Lockup Dummy 0 0.25 -0.25 -96.62 
 
0.05 0.19 0.41 
Minimum Investment  0.49 2.05 -1.56 -5.71 
 
1.32 1.77 2.29 
         
Average Leverage 31.48 57.71 -26.23 -7.98 
 
56.40 69.73 45.62 
Leverage Dummy 0.33 0.52 -0.19 -12.97 
 
0.43 0.59 0.45 
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Table 3: Suspicious Patterns in Reported Returns 
This table compares suspicious patterns in reported returns of absolute return UCITS (ARU) and hedge funds (HF) across domiciles (Europe, 
Offshore and USA). We require that each fund has at least 24 return observations over the period from January 2005 to June 2012. A set of used 
measures is based on Bollen and Pool (2012). Greater manipulation in reported returns are indicated by + or − sigs. Table reports the cross-
sectional means and their difference tests. Panel A reports the asset liquidity proxy. ‘Autocorrelation’ refers to the test statistic of the first-order 
coefficient in a MA(1) model of returns. Panel B reports discontinuity in the distribution of returns proxy. ‘Kink’ refers to the test statistic of the 
kink flag, measuring the abnormal rate of reporting small losses. Panel C reports two measures of low correlation. ‘Index R²’ is the p-value of the 
slope coefficient from a regression of fund returns on a corresponding style index. ‘Max R²’ refers to the adjusted R-square of fund returns against 
the seven Fung–Hsieh (2004) factors and the four Agarwal–Naik (2000) factors. Panel D reports four measures of data-quality. ‘% Repeat’ is 
triggered by a high number of returns that are repeated. ‘# Zero’ refers to the number of zero returns. ‘% Negative’ refers to the fraction of 
negative returns. ‘Uniform’ refers to the test statistic of the uniformity of the last digit in reported returns. ‘PC Misvalution’ is the 1st principal 
component of the Bollen-Pool (2012) ‘red flags’. 
 
Panel A: Asset liquidity 
 
       
Hedge Fund Domicile 
  Manipulation HF ARU Difference t-statistic   Europe Offshore USA 
Autocorrelation + 0.96 0.26 0.70 15.17   0.58 1.20 1.02 
          Panel B: Discontinuity in the distribution of fund returns 
 
       
Hedge Fund Domicile 
  Manipulation HF ARU Difference t-statistic   Europe Offshore USA 
Kink − -0.16 0.11 -0.27 -6.70   -0.07 -0.15 -0.17 
          Panel C: Measures of low correlation between fund returns and the returns of style factors 
 
       
Hedge Fund Domicile 
  Manipulation HF ARU Difference t-statistic   Europe Offshore USA 
Index R² + 0.09 0.02 0.07 17.47   0.06 0.08 0.13 
Max R² − 0.43 0.57 -0.14 -22.15   0.46 0.41 0.44 
           
 
 48 
 
Panel D: Family of data-quality indicators 
       
Hedge Fund Domicile 
  Manipulation HF ARU Difference t-statistic   Europe Offshore USA 
% Repeat + 0.03 0.01 0.02 6.18 
 
0.03 0.03 0.03 
# Zero + 0.38 0.27 0.11 3.59 
 
0.58 0.41 0.30 
% Negative − 0.38 0.42 -0.04 -11.77 
 
0.41 0.38 0.38 
Uniform + 16.81 15.79 1.02 4.25   16.29 16.75 17.33 
          
Panel E: Combining proxies of suspicious reported returns 
       
Hedge Fund Domicile 
  Manipulation HF ARU Difference t-statistic   Europe Offshore USA 
 
PC Misvaluation + 0.01 -0.30 0.31 11.02  -0.09 0.02 0.01 
 
 
  
Table 4: Past Violations and Conflicts of Interest 
 
This table compares the operational risk measures and their sources of hedge funds and absolute return UCITS. 
Panel A reports operational risk measures. Panel B (Panel C) report a set of proxies for the external (internal) 
conflicts of interest. We report results separately across hedge funds domiciles. ‘ADV-filers (%)’ is the portion 
of funds file ADV for SEC. ‘Problem Funds (%)’ refers to funds that answered Yes to at least one question in 
Item 11 of ADV filing. Item 11 identifies any “problems” that the management or related advisory affiliates 
have, including felonies, investment-related misdemeanors or any agency, SEC, CFTC, or self-regulatory issues, 
regulatory disciplinary action as well as civil lawsuits. ‘Omega score’ is the Brown, Goetzmann, Liang and 
Schwarz (2008, 2009) operational risk measure. Estimation of Omega is described in Appendix.. 
‘Broker/Dealer’ is 1 if the fund has a related broker/dealer. ‘Investment Adviser’, ‘Commodities Broker’, 
‘Bank’, ‘Insurance’ and ‘Sponsor of LLP’ are 1 if the fund is related to one of these companies respectively. 
‘BuySellYourOwn’ is 1 if the company buys and sells between itself and clients. ‘BuySellYourselfClients’ is 1 
if a related party buys and sells securities also recommended to the fund. ‘RecSecYouOwn’ is 1 if the fund 
recommends securities in which a related party has an ownership interest. ‘AgencyCrossTrans’ is 1 if the fund 
performs agency cross transactions. ‘RecUnderwriter’ is 1 if a related party recommends securities to clients for 
which they are the underwriter. ‘RecSalesInterest' is 1 if a related party recommends securities with a sales 
interest. ‘RecBrokers’ is 1 if a related party recommends. ‘OtherResearch’ is 1 if the fund uses external research. 
Frequency of conflicts is the total sum of conflicts within a specific category. ‘PC External Conflicts’ is the 1st 
principal component of external conflicts of interest variables. ‘PC Internal Conflicts’ is the 1st principal 
component of external conflicts of interest variables. ‘PC Conflicts’ is the 1st principal component of conflicts of 
interest variables. 
 
Panel A: Problem Funds and Operational Risk 
 
 
All Funds 
 
Hedge Fund Domicile 
 
ARU HF Diff t-statistic 
 
Europe Offshore USA 
ADV-filers (%) 0.24 0.26 -0.02 -1.47   0.17 0.31 0.31 
Problem funds (%) 0.40 0.27 0.13 3.69 
 
0.45 0.29 0.18 
Omega score 0.33 0.25 0.09 24.05 
 
0.28 0.26 0.21 
         
Panel B: External Conflicts of Interest 
 
 
All Funds 
 
Hedge Fund Domicile 
 
%Yes 
   
%Yes 
With: ARU HF Diff t-statistic   Europe Offshore USA 
Broker/Dealer 0.46 0.32 0.14 4.67 
 
0.52 0.31 0.28 
Commodities Brokers 0.70 0.48 0.22 7.93 
 
0.58 0.56 0.33 
Investment Adviser 0.87 0.67 0.19 9.30 
 
0.84 0.76 0.51 
Bank 0.20 0.13 0.07 2.92 
 
0.41 0.10 0.09 
Insurance 0.15 0.11 0.04 1.90 
 
0.23 0.09 0.11 
Sponsor of LLP 0.17 0.14 0.03 1.20 
 
0.22 0.16 0.10 
# External Conflicts  2.54 1.85 0.69 7.13   2.80 1.98 1.41 
PC External Conflicts 0.72 0.33 0.39 5.75  1.02 0.37 0.09 
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Panel C: Internal Conflicts of Interest 
 
 
All Funds 
 
Hedge Fund Domicile 
 
%Yes 
   
%Yes 
  ARU HF Diff t-statistic   Europe Offshore USA 
BuySellYourOwn 0.12 0.15 -0.03 -1.13 
 
0.14 0.13 0.17 
BuySellYourselfClients 0.74 0.75 -0.02 -0.61 
 
0.58 0.72 0.84 
RecSecYouOwn 0.54 0.46 0.07 2.19 
 
0.62 0.39 0.54 
AgencyCrossTrans 0.10 0.07 0.03 1.44 
 
0.15 0.06 0.07 
RecUnderwriter 0.52 0.52 0.00 -0.04 
 
0.55 0.48 0.57 
RecSalesInterest 0.31 0.19 0.13 4.03 
 
0.39 0.16 0.17 
RecBrokers 0.39 0.51 -0.12 -3.66 
 
0.39 0.46 0.60 
OtherResearch 0.89 0.69 0.20 9.20 
 
0.69 0.69 0.71 
# Internal Conflicts 3.60 3.34 0.26 2.31   3.50 3.09 3.66 
PC Internal Conflicts 0.22 0.09 0.13 2.00  0.29 -0.05 0.23 
         
Panel D: Total Frequency of Conflicts of Interest 
 
# Conflicts 6.41 5.28 1.13 5.87   6.51 5.18 5.16 
PC Conflicts 0.65 0.25 0.40 5.47  0.85 0.21 0.16 
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Table 5: Probit Model Analysis on the Past Violations 
 
The dependent variable in all models is 1 if the fund has a problem (past violations), and 0 if the fund does not 
have a problem (past violations). ‘ARUs’ is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if a fund is UCITS-compliant 
and 0 otherwise. ‘PC Misvalution’ is the 1st principal component of the Bollen-Pool (2012) ‘red flags’. The 
conflicts of interest variables are as in Table 4. ‘Heckman’s λ’ is the inverse Mills ratio that is used to correct for 
selection bias and is obtained from the 1
st
 stage selection equation which models the probability that a fund files 
form ADV (‘Problem’-indicator) to the SEC. The Probit model includes strategy fixed effects. Standard errors 
are corrected for clustering at the fund-level. ‘Chi.Prob’ refers to the associated p-value. 
 
 
Variable Par.Est Chi.Prob 
 
Par.Est Chi.Prob 
ARU 0.43 <.001 
 
-0.09 0.46 
      
PC Misvaluation 0.05 0.04 
 
0.04 0.24 
      
BrokerDealer 
   
0.75 <.001 
InvAdviser 
   
-0.01 0.92 
Commod 
   
0.22 0.00 
Bank 
   
-0.34 0.00 
Insur 
   
0.83 <.001 
PartSponsor 
   
0.90 <.001 
      
BuySellYourOwn 
   
0.05 0.51 
BuySellYourselfClien 
   
0.09 0.18 
RecSecYouOwn 
   
0.30 <.001 
AgencyCrossTrans 
   
0.31 0.01 
RecUnderwriter 
   
0.07 0.32 
RecSalesInterest 
   
-0.17 0.02 
RecBrokers 
   
0.06 0.34 
OtherResearch 
   
0.18 0.00 
      
Heckman’s λ 0.34 <.001 
 
0.30 0.01 
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Table 6: Risk-adjusted Performance Differences 
 
Panel A (Panel B) reports for the equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolios from January 2005 through June 2013. ‘Alpha’ refers to the 
annualized intercept of the 9-factor model. ‘t-stat’ is the Newey–West (1987) adjusted t-statistic of alpha. Risk loadings are estimated using the 
excess returns of the S&P 500 index (SP), the return spread between the Russell 2000 index and the S&P 500 index (SIZE), the excess return of 
ten‐year Treasuries (CGS10), the spread return between Moody’s BAA and ten‐year Treasuries (CREDSPR), the excess returns of look‐back 
straddles on bonds (PTFSBD), currencies (PTFSFX), and commodities (PTFSCOM) as well as the excess return of the MSCI Emerging Market 
Index (MSEMKF) and the Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) currency risk factor (RX). ‘R²’ refers to the R-squared of the model. Panel C 
(Panel D) reports cross-sectional medians of individual funds and their differences tests for the study period from January 2005 through December 
2009 (January 2010 through June 2013). Measures are computed for fund that have at least 24 return observations using Getmansky, Lo and 
Makarov (2004) smoothing adjusted returns. ‘Mean’ denotes the fund’s average return. ‘Std’ denotes the fund’s return standard deviation. ‘Sharpe’ 
denotes the annualized Sharpe ratio. ‘ES’ denotes historical expected shortfall at the 10% level. ‘MPPM’ is the Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and 
Welch’s (2007) Manipulation-proof Performance Measure. ‘SystRisk’ is defined as the difference of return standard deviation and residual risk. 
‘IdioRisk’ denotes the residual risk that is obtained from the 9-factor model. 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted Portfolios of Hedge Funds (HF) and UCITS-compliant Funds (ARU) 
             
Class Alpha t-stat SP SIZE CGS10 CREDSPR PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM MSEMKF RX R² 
HF 1.176 1.362 0.063 -0.025 -0.112 0.106 0.005 0.005 -0.004 0.174 0.385 0.914 
ARU -1.061 -0.975 0.142 -0.078 -0.044 0.151 0.008 0.003 -0.004 0.261 0.862 0.954 
Difference -2.237 -2.337 0.080 -0.052 0.068 0.045 0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.087 0.477 0.040 
t-statistic -2.38 -2.44 2.65 -1.20 0.97 1.28 0.31 -0.41 0.01 4.02 6.11 
 
             
Panel B: Value-weighted Portfolios of Hedge Funds (HF) and UCITS-compliant Funds (ARU) 
             
Class Alpha t-stat SP SIZE CGS10 CREDSPR PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM MSEMKF RX R² 
HF 1.502 1.412 0.036 -0.082 -0.068 0.098 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.160 0.273 0.814 
ARU -1.057 -0.862 0.092 -0.117 -0.078 0.145 0.013 0.000 -0.004 0.173 1.087 0.930 
Difference -2.559 -2.274 0.056 -0.036 -0.010 0.047 0.008 -0.001 -0.009 0.013 0.814 0.116 
t-statistic -2.24 -2.21 1.49 -0.86 -0.13 1.42 0.59 -0.14 -1.42 0.47 10.45 
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Panel C: Medians from January 2005 to December 2009 
             
  
A set of performance and risk measures 
 
9-Factor Model 
All Funds N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 132 3.07 23.53 0.15 12.13 -13.66 
 
-0.48 -0.08 11.92 10.64 0.75 
HF 9151 3.13 16.78 0.20 8.19 -4.75 
 
0.65 0.09 5.28 10.92 0.40 
Difference 
 
-0.06 6.75 -0.05 3.94 -8.91 
 
-1.12 -0.17 6.64 -0.28 0.35 
t-statistic   -0.73 5.35 -0.85 5.92 -5.08 
 
-3.00 -2.02 10.62 -1.49 13.95 
  
          
 
Panel D: Medians from January 2010 to June 2013 
  
          
 
All Funds N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 456 1.35 15.13 0.10 7.76 -4.63 
 
0.36 0.06 8.93 5.38 0.80 
HF 8460 3.42 14.61 0.27 7.04 -1.93 
 
0.87 0.14 5.75 7.24 0.51 
Difference 
 
-2.07 0.52 -0.17 0.72 -2.70 
 
-0.51 -0.08 3.17 -1.86 0.30 
t-statistic   -5.90 4.05 -8.26 7.11 -7.48 
 
-3.36 -3.94 14.19 -9.94 19.71 
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Table 7: Multivariate Performance Regressions 
 
This table reports results from a regression model where the monthly fund’s 9-factor alpha is regressed on ‘ARU’, an indicator variable that is 1 if 
the fund is UCITS-compliant and 0, otherwise. The other explanatory variables used are described in Table 2. ‘Baseline’ provides results for the 
base case including all funds. ‘Selection Bias Correction’ corrects sample selection bias using the Heckman method. The first stage of this method 
models the propensity that the fund is UCITS-compliant. In the second stage the fitted values of the ARU indicator are used as independent 
variables. The time period is from January 2005 through June 2013. Strategy and time fixed effects are included. Standard errors are corrected for 
within-fund clustering. ‘Chi.Prob’ refers to the associated p-value. 
 
 
Baseline 
 
Selection Bias Correction 
 
 
  
 
1st stage 
 
2nd stage 
 
 
Par.Est. t-stat 
 
Par.Est. Chi.Prob   Par.Est. t-stat 
 
ARU -0.0012 -4.29     
  
-0.0002 -2.45   
          
Log (1+ Restriction) 0.0013 2.61 
    
0.0018 3.27 
 
          
Leverage 0.0004 2.71 
    
0.0003 1.58 
 
          
Log (1 + Min. Invest.) 0.0006 4.02 
    
0.0005 3.37 
 
          
Log (1 + Lockup) 0.0006 2.14 
    
0.0004 1.40 
 
          
Management Fee 0.0033 0.22 
 
-34.65 <.001 
    
          
Incentive Fee 0.0037 2.34 
 
-3.29 <.001 
 
0.0034 1.83 
 
          
High-Water Mark 0.0009 4.01 
    
0.0008 3.13 
 
          
Lagged Size 0.0001 1.54 
    
0.0001 2.17 
 
          
Lagged Age -0.0001 -3.72 
    
-0.0001 -4.04 
 
          
Lagged Flow 0.0009 1.72 
    
0.0006 1.03 
 
          
Inception Family Size 
   
0.09 <.001 
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Table 8: Liquidity-Performance Trade-off 
 
Panel A (Panel C) reports the annualized alpha differences between ARUs and liquid (illiquid) European onshore hedge funds. Panel B reports the 
liquidity-Performance trade-off for European onshore hedge funds and ARUs. ‘Restriction’ is the sum of redemption period and notice period in 
days. ‘9-Factor Model’ is defined in the previous table. ‘11-Factor Model’ includes the additional factors. ‘BaB’ is the factor loading for the 
Betting-Against-Beta factor (Frazzini and Pedersen 2014). ‘PS’ is the factor loading for the market liquidity risk (Pastor and Stambaugh 2003). 
 
Panel A: ARUs vs. Liquid European Onshore Funds 
            
  
9-Factor Model 
 
11-Factor Model 
     
 
      
 
Restriction Alpha t-stat R² 
 
Alpha t-stat 
 
BaB PS R² 
ARU [0, 14] -1.061 -0.975 0.954 
 
-1.321 -1.234   0.062 0.013 0.955 
Liquid [0, 14] -0.612 -0.488 0.904 
 
-0.917 -0.744   0.074 0.015 0.907 
Liquid - ARU 
 
0.449 0.487 -0.050 
 
0.404 0.491 
 
0.011 0.002 -0.048 
t-statistic 
 
0.54 0.71 
 
 
0.49 0.70 
 
0.52 0.08 
 
     
 
      
Panel B: European Onshore Funds Liquidity Performance Trade-off 
            
  
9-Factor Model 
 
11-Factor Model 
 
Restriction Alpha t-stat R² 
 
Alpha t-stat 
 
BaB PS R² 
Liquid [0, 14] -0.612 -0.488 0.904 
 
-0.917 -0.744   0.074 0.015 0.907 
Europe  (14, 100) -0.105 -0.075 0.863 
 
-0.684 -0.519 
 
0.145 0.025 0.878 
Illiquid  [100, ∞) 1.988 1.330 0.883 
 
1.253 0.904   0.177 0.036 0.899 
Illiquid - Liquid 
 
2.600 1.818 -0.021 
 
2.170 1.648 
 
0.103 0.021 -0.008 
t-statistic 
 
1.58 1.47 
 
 
1.369 1.320 
 
1.915 0.576 
 
     
 
      
Panel C: ARUs vs. Illiquid European Onshore Funds 
            
  
9-Factor Model 
 
11-Factor Model 
 
Restriction Alpha t-stat R² 
 
Alpha t-stat 
 
BaB PS R² 
ARU [0, 14] -1.061 -0.975 0.954 
 
-1.321 -1.234   0.062 0.013 0.955 
Illquid  [100, ∞) 1.988 1.330 0.883 
 
1.253 0.904   0.177 0.036 0.899 
Illquid - ARU 
 
3.049 2.305 -0.071 
 
2.574 2.139 
 
0.115 0.023 -0.056 
t-statistic 
 
1.97 1.92 
 
 
1.76 1.77 
 
2.56 0.82 
 
 56 
Table 9: Comparing Matched UCITS and non-UCITS funds 
 
Panel A (Panel B) presents the pooled regression results for the matched UCITS and non-UCITS funds that 
belong to the same management firm (are managed by the same fund manager side-by side). ‘ΔFH9 Alpha’ 
refers to 9-factor alpha difference of the UCITS-compliant and non-UCITS. ‘ΔFH11 Alpha’ refers to respective 
11-factor alpha difference. ‘Restriction dummy’ gets a value of 0 if both of the funds in a pair provide at least bi-
weekly liquidity and 1 if the hedge fund’s restriction period is longer than two weeks. ‘ΔLeverage’ is the 
difference in average leverage of UCITS and non-UCITS fund. The ΔControl variables are constructed as in 
Table 7, but we take differences. We control for both strategy and time fixed effects. Standard errors are 
adjusted for within fund cluster correlation. 
 
 
Panel A: Only UCITS and non-UCITS Pairs from to the Same Management Company 
 
 
 
ΔFH9 Alpha: HF − ARU 
 
ΔFH11 Alpha: HF − ARU 
  
Par.Est. t-stat 
 
Par.Est. t-stat 
Restriction dummy   0.0015 1.92   0.0018 2.06 
ΔLeverage 
 
0.0017 4.26 
 
0.0015 2.71 
Control variables? 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Strategy and time 
effects?  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
       
 
 
 
Panel B: Only UCITS and non-UCITS Pairs with the Same Fund Manager (Side-by-Side Management) 
 
 
 
ΔFH9 Alpha: HF − ARU 
 
ΔFH11 Alpha: HF − ARU 
  
Par.Est. t-stat 
 
Par.Est. t-stat 
Restriction dummy   0.0085 5.07   0.0125 5.11 
ΔLeverage 
 
0.0072 5.30 
 
0.0075 4.24 
Control variables? 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Strategy and time 
effects?  
Yes 
  
Yes 
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Appendix A: UCITS Regulation  
 
UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) refers to a set of 
European Union Directives establishing a harmonized legal framework for the creation, management 
and marketing of collective investment schemes in the EU (and EEA) Member States. Below we 
briefly review how UCITS fund rules have evolved over time and summarize the requirements under 
the latest version of UCITS that is UCITS IV.  
 
Appendix A.1: Evolution of UCITS Regulation 
 
UCITS I (1985) 
The aim of the original UCITS Directive 85/611/EEC, adopted in 1985, was to allow for open-
ended funds investing in transferable securities to be subject to the same regulation in every Member 
State. Under UCITS I, derivatives could only be used for hedging and efficient portfolio management, 
that is with the aim of reducing risk or cost, or to replicate a position that could  otherwise be achieved 
through investing in the underlying asset. 
 
UCTIS II (early 1990s) 
In the early 1990s attempts were made to amend the 1985 Directive and more successfully 
harmonize laws throughout Europe, since several obstacles become apparent in following UCITS I.  
Individual marketing rules in each Member State created obstacles to cross-border marketing of 
UCITS. The limited definition of permitted investments for UCITS also weakened the marketing 
possibilities of a UCITS. Attempts to reform UCITS in the 1990s faltered and it was not until the 
introduction in 2001 of Directive 2001/108/EC (generally known as the “Product Directive”) and 
Directive 2001/107/EC (generally known as the “Management Directive”) that substantive change was 
eventually introduced.
1
  
 
UCITS III (2002): 
The UCITS III revision gave asset managers a broader scope of eligible assets. At the same 
time, the requirements on investor protection were increased and called for an independent risk 
                                                 
1
 The Product Directive and the Management Directive are generally collectively referred to as “UCITS III”. 
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management function (to limit/monitor leverage, counterparty risk, concentration limits, etc.). UCITS 
III expanded the range of available investments to include derivatives for investment purposes, other 
UCITS and cash.  This dramatically increased investor choice, allowing for cash funds, funds of fund, 
mixed asset funds and absolute return UCITS or UCITS hedge funds. This has allowed a number of 
hedge fund strategies to be accommodated within the UCITS format such as equity long/short, relative 
value, etc. Some strategies, however, remain difficult to implement within the UCITS framework 
because the underlying asset class is not permissible (for example, individual commodities or bank 
loans) or because of the lack of liquidity (for example, distressed debt). 
 
UCITS IV (2009-11) 
The UCITS IV directive introduced the management company passport and allows a UCITS to 
be managed by a management company authorised and supervised in a Member State other than its 
home Member State. UCITS IV has increased the governance (“organisational”) requirements of 
UCITS Management Companies and funds and has brought these requirements more in line with 
MIFID.
2
  UCITS or its management company needs to establish independent compliance and audit 
functions in addition to the independent risk management which was already required under UCITS III 
but which has been expanded to formalise the management of a variety of risks. 
The “organization directive” contains requirements for organizational and internal control, and 
conflicts of interest. According to the directive conflicts of interest may arise if: 
• the management company is likely to make a financial gain, or avoid a financial loss, at 
the expense of the UCITS fund; 
•  the management company has an interest in the outcome of a service provided to the 
UCITS or another client which does not share the interests of the UCITS fund; 
• the management company has an incentive to favour the interest of another client; 
• the management company carries out the same activities for the UCITS as for another 
client; 
• the management company receives money, goods or services illegally. 
 
                                                 
2
 The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC (known as "MiFID") is a European Union law that aims at 
creating harmonized regulation for investment services across the 30 member states of the European Economic Area (the 27 
Member States of the European Union plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein). See, for example, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/index_en.htm#isd. 
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UCITS V (2013 -2015 ) 
The UCITS V directive was adopted by the European Union on 23 July 2014. There are three key 
elements in the directive which govern (1) depositaries’ duties, (2) remuneration policies including 
retention and deferral of variable remuneration and (3) a sanctions regime. The remuneration policies 
are required to (i) be consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management of the UCITS, 
(ii) should not encourage risk-taking which is inconsistent with the risk profiles or fund rules governing 
the relevant UCITS and (iii) not impair compliance with the UCITS Manager’s duty to act in the best 
interest of the UCITS. UCITS V can be compared with the Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive ("AIFMD"), which is a parallel regulation for hedge funds and alternative investments. 
UCITS VI (Consultation Period)  
A consultation document for the UCITS VI directive has been issued. The EU commission asks 
respondents whether there is a need to review the list of eligible assets under UCITS. Other topics in 
the consultation paper include efficient portfolio management, OTC derivatives, liquidity management 
and money market funds. 
 
Appendix A.2: Current UCITS (IV) Regulation Requirements 
 
A.2.1 Eligible Assets: 
A UCITS can only invest in eligible assets. The eligible assets that a UCITS can invest in include:  
 Transferable securities – essentially, publicly traded equities or bonds, listed on mainstream 
stock exchanges. 
 Deposits and Money Market instruments (MMIs) – Cash deposits with “credit institutions” (i.e. 
banks) can be held as investment assets, together with MMIs. These might include treasury and 
local authority bills, certificates of deposit or commercial paper. Thus pure cash funds can be 
UCITS. 
 Certain other funds: open-ended mutual funds where those are other UCITS or non-UCITS 
funds with UCITS-like traits. This has allowed the development of UCITS funds of funds. 
 Financial Derivative Instruments (following UCITS III): funds are able to use derivatives for 
investment purposes, using exchange-traded or over-the-counter (“OTC”) instruments, with 
some limitations. The underlying of a derivative must be one of the following types (i) an 
eligible asset of the type mentioned above, (ii) interest rates, (iii) currencies, (iv) financial 
4 
 
indices. 
 Short-selling: Physical short selling is not permitted. However, the same economic effect can be 
achieved and is allowed through the use of derivatives such as Contracts for Difference 
(“CFDs”). 
 Ineligible assets – certain assets remains out of scope:  
o Real estate 
o Bank loans 
o Physical metals such as gold (although certain securities based on metals are permitted) 
o Commodities (although derivatives on financial indices such as commodity indices are 
eligible) 
 
A.2.2. Diversification Requirements, Risk and Leverage Limits: 
 
Diversification rules: 
UCITS must operate on a principle of risk spreading, which means that restrictions apply which 
limit the spread of investments, leverage and exposure.  A UCITS must be properly diversified. The so-
called 5/10/40 Rule states that a UCITS cannot invest more than 5% of its assets in securities issued by 
a single issuer. However, this limit can be increased up to 10% provided that where the 5% limit is 
exceeded, the exposure to these issuers, when added together, does not exceed 40% of the fund’s 
assets. There are also rules around the proportion of a company that a UCITS may hold in that it might 
gain significant influence over its management. Rules exist too regarding the amount of a company’s 
debt or non-voting shares that can be held. 
 
Risk Limits: 
There are two approaches to risk limits: the commitment approach and the VaR (Value-at-Risk) 
approach. 
  
The Commitment Approach 
This essentially aggregates the underlying notional value of stock and derivatives to determine 
the degree of gross exposure (called “global exposure” in the Directive). The commitment approach is 
potentially suitable for Long-only funds, or UCITS funds making a simple or limited use of 
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derivatives. Under the commitment measure, the leverage limit generated by using financial derivatives 
is limited to 100% of the UCITS’ net asset value.  With the 10% short term overdraft facility that all 
funds are permitted, this means the total gross exposure of the fund cannot exceed 210% of the net 
asset value of the fund. 
 
Value at Risk 
The VaR approach is an alternative to the commitment approach and has two versions, the 
absolute and the relative VaR approach. The VaR approach has advantages over the commitment 
approach since it captures risk exposures better and is more suitable for funds that make use of 
derivatives. Gross exposures can be quite high in funds that use derivatives or shorting. The VaR limit, 
for UCITS purposes, is calculated on a monthly basis using a confidence interval of 99%. The VaR can 
be either calculated in absolute or in relative terms. Absolute return UCITS must limit their 1-month 
99% VaR to twice that of the benchmark index.  Absolute return funds must stand within the limit of 
20%.     
 
A.2.3. Liquidity requirements and custody: 
 
A UCITS must be open-ended i.e. shares or units in the fund may be redeemed on demand by 
investors. A UCITS must be liquid, that is, its underlying investments must be liquid enough to support 
redemptions in the fund on at least a fortnightly basis. In practice, most UCITS funds UCITS funds 
allow daily dealing. Assets must be entrusted to an independent custodian or depositary and held in a 
ring-fenced account on behalf of investors. 
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Appendix B: Robustness Tests 
 
B.1. Data Gathering Process 
Our data comes mainly from a consolidation of five commercial hedge fund database (Barclay Hedge, 
Eureka Hedge, Hedge Fund Research, Morningstar, and Lipper TASS). Lipper TASS includes virtually 
no ARU funds
3
, and rest of the databases include indicators of whether the fund is UCITS compliant. 
We use these indicators to classify the funds into absolute return UCITS funds (ARU) and hedge funds 
(HF). Furthermore, to study the effects of geography and regulation more carefully, we decompose 
hedge funds (HF) further into European onshore (Europe), global offshore (Offshore) and US-based 
(USA) hedge funds. Our raw sample period is from January 2003 to June 2013, since the first UCITS-
compliant alternative funds started appearing in 2003. But in our empirical tests we use the sample 
period from January 2005 to June 2013, to mitigate the problems associated with survivorship bias 
(Table 1 of main paper).  
It is not a trivial task to merge several commercial hedge fund databases and to identify unique 
hedge funds based on information on multiple share classes. The main reason is that commercial data 
vendors only provide an identifier for unique share classes, but they do not provide identifiers for 
distinct hedge funds. We use the Joenväärä, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2014) merging approach, to 
identify unique hedge funds. However, we hand-match ARUs as clusters that have a unique root fund 
name. The rationale is a large number of currency share classes that are difficult to match using a 
statistical merging approach. Table B1 reports the number of unique ARUs we have in our database. 
There is significant number of currency share classes. Even though there are a large number UCITS-
compliant funds that are denominated in euros, we convert (using rates from Bloomberg) both UCITS 
and non-UICTS funds’ returns and AuMs into US dollars because the majority of hedge funds report 
their returns in US dollars. 
 
B.2. Operational Risk 
B.2.1. Suspicious Patterns in Reported Returns 
To investigate whether funds misreport their returns, we use a set of measures proposed by Bollen and 
Pool (2012). Following their paper, we require at least 24 months of contiguous returns. Untypical to 
hedge fund studies, the returns are not backfill-adjusted, since we are interested in suspicious patterns 
                                                 
3
 We hand-collect few UCITS compliant funds from Lipper TASS and reclassify them as UCITS funds.  
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everywhere in the return series. Bollen and Pool use returns only from US dollar denominated funds, 
but our data includes non-US funds (most ARUs are euro denominated), so we have modified their 
measures by specifying for each measure whether it is more naturally calculated using USD-converted 
returns, or non-currency-converted returns. The original measures of Bollen and Pool are indicator 
variables that take a value of one if a measure-specific null hypothesis is rejected at 10% level. For 
simplicity, though, we have mostly used the test statistics instead of the resulting indicators, since 
finding the critical values is complicated. However, significant differences in the test statistics should 
reflect significant differences in the indicator variables.
4
 
 The only asset liquidity measure we have replicated here is the Autocorrelation, which refers to 
the test statistic of the first-order coefficient in a MA(1) -model of non-currency-converted 
returns, with higher values associated with more manipulation. 
 The proxy for discontinuity in the distribution of non-currency-converted returns around zero, 
or the so-called Kink measure. It refers to the test statistic measuring whether small losses are 
reported at a suspiciously low rate compared to small gains. Smaller values are associated with 
higher return manipulation. 
 Two measures of low correlation: Index R2 is the p-value of the slope coefficient from a 
regression of USD-converted fund returns on a corresponding equally-weighted style index, 
with higher values denoting more return manipulation. Max R
2
 is the maximum adjusted R-
square of fund USD-converted returns against the seven factors of Fung and Hsieh (2004) and 
the four option factors of Agarwal and Naik (2004), with lower values denoting more return 
manipulation; the optimal factors maximizing the adjusted R-square are found via stepwise 
regression, with a maximum number of factors of six. 
 Four measures of data-quality, all based on non-currency-converted returns. The calculation of 
these measures is sometimes simplified from the original measures of Bollen and Pool (2012). 
Measure % Repeat refers to an indicator that takes a value of one if the fund has a repeat of at 
least three returns (rounded to four decimals), with higher values corresponding to more return 
manipulation. Measure # Zero is the number of zero returns, with larger values corresponding 
to more return manipulations, Measure % Negative refers to the fraction of negative returns 
corresponding to more return manipulation. Measure Uniform refers to the test statistic of the 
uniformity of the last digit in reported returns again corresponding to more return manipulation. 
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 Bollen and Pool themselves also use the non-indicator versions in some of their regressions. 
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In Table B2, we report suspicious patterns in reported returns only for hedge funds that are 
domiciles in Europe. We still find that European onshore hedge funds report more suspicious return 
patterns compared to UCITS-compliant funds. We can therefore conclude that our results are not 
driven by geography or domicile effects. 
 
B.2.2 Conflicts of Interest 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires US-based professional investment advisors 
(exceeding a threshold on assets under management and number of clients) to register as such by filing 
an annually updated Form ADV report, which includes rich information about, for example, the 
advisor’s assets, clients, employees, investment style, affiliates, and history. The Item 11 of the Form 
ADV asks for past legal or regulatory violations of the advisor or its affiliates, and Brown et al. (2008, 
2009) show that these past violations are connected to other information in the Form ADVs, such as 
conflicts of interest, and also to hedge fund characteristics. 
We use the historical filings available at Historical Archive of Investment Adviser Reports 
(http://www.sec.gov/foia/iareports/inva-archive.htm). These filings contain only the basic items of the 
Form ADV report, and not the additional schedules, which are also used by Brown et al. (2008, 2009) 
to gather information about managerial ownership. We use the snapshot of Form ADV reports of June 
2013, and use only Item 7 (external conflicts of interest), Item 8 (internal conflicts of interest), and 
Item 11 (past violations). From these items, we extract advisor-level indicator variables, which are then 
mapped to fund-level. From Item 7, we extract six indicators of external conflicts of interest, namely 
relations to broker-dealers (RelBrokerDealer), commodities brokers (RelCommod), investment 
advisors (RelInvAdviser), banks (RelBank), insurance companies (RelInsur), and sponsorship to limited 
partnerships (RelPartSponsor). From Item 8, we extract eight indicators of internal conflicts of interest: 
whether the advisor buys and sells securities between itself and its clients (BuySellYourOwn); whether 
the advisor recommends securities in which a related party has an ownership interest (RecSecYouOwn); 
whether the advisor performs agency cross transactions (AgencyCrossTrans); whether a related party 
recommends securities to clients for which they are the underwriter (RecUnderwriter); whether a 
related party recommends securities with a sales interest (RecSalesInterest); and whether the advisor 
uses external research (OtherResearch). From Item 11 I extract a single problem indicator (Problem) 
that takes a value of one if the advisor (or any of its related persons) has had legal or regulatory 
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violations during the last 10 years. Finally, we have calculated a sum of external indicators 
(SumExternal), a sum of internal indicators (SumInternal) and a sum of all indicators (SumTotal). We 
also have calculated the first principal components for all of these. 
 
B.2.2. Omega-score and Probit Model Analysis 
To estimate Omega-scores (ω) for each fund, we use its advisor’s Form ADV from June 2013 to find 
the fund’s Problem indicator variable. Omega is defined as the fitted value from a probit model of the 
Problem indicator against a number of fund characteristics.
5
 In other words, ω predicts the Problem 
indicator, but is applicable to all funds, not just those registered with SEC. The estimation has been 
done using all hedge funds, or only those with European domicile.  
More precisely, we first run a probit model for an ADV indicator (equal to whether the fund's 
advisor has a Form ADV report as of June 2013) against 10 fund variables known through previous 
research to be related to operational risk: six static variables (Management Fee, Incentive Fee, High-
water Mark, Notice Period, Lockup Dummy, Leverage Dummy) and four dynamic (based on a 12-
month rolling window) variables (Average Return, Standard Deviation, Auto Correlation, Log of AuM, 
Age). The inverse Mills ratio of the fitted probability from this probit model constitutes the fund's λ 
measure, which is a proxy for the fund's propensity for filing Form ADV. 
Table B3 shows the results of these probit regressions. For robustness, we have estimated the 
models separately for all funds (Global) and European funds only (Europe), although the only global 
version is used later. The coefficient for fund size is also consistently positive, consistent with a size 
threshold required for SEC registration. 
 
B.3. Risk-adjusted Returns 
This section discusses the assumptions that are used in our fund performance analysis. Backfill- and 
size-adjustment is done simultaneously, by removing all observations that are either among the first 12 
return observations, or are observed before first hitting the minimum AUM of $5 million. 
 
B.3.1. Baseline Results 
The baseline results presented in main paper are estimated using the following steps. These excess 
return statistics are calculated using Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) (hereafter GLM) unsmoothed 
                                                 
5
 The other possible Omega’s definition would be the canonical correlation of fund characteristics against Form ADV 
variables. 
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USD returns. Returns used are backfill- and size-adjusted. Mean, Std, Sharpe and MPPM are in 
annualized percentage. MPPM is calculated with risk aversion coefficient of 5. ES is in monthly 
percentage and calculated at 90% level. MaxDrawdown is in percentage. Untabulated results suggest 
that conclusions are unchanged if we use maximum drawdown instead of ES. 
 
B.3.2. Local-Currency Excess Returns 
These excess return statistics are the same as in previous subsection, but the returns used are in local 
currencies. We find that our results are not sensitive to the currency choice or transformation. Among 
other things, this reduces the volatility of euro funds, since EUR-to-USD conversion increases return 
volatility. Left-hand side of Panel A of Table B4 shows that our baseline performance results holds 
when we use local currencies instead of USD-transformed currencies.   
 
B.3.3 Fung–Hsieh Risk-Adjusted Returns 
These risk-adjusted return statistics are calculated using GLM-unsmoothed USD returns. Returns used 
are backfill- and size-adjusted. The risk factors used are the FH9 factors. Alpha, SystRisk and IdioRisk 
are in annualized percentage. Alpha t-statistic is period-independent. R
2
 is the adjusted R-square. 
 
B.3.4. Stepwise Risk-Adjusted Returns 
These risk-adjusted return statistics are the same as in previous subsection, but calculated using 
stepwise regression against a large set of 26 risk factors. The factors used are the nine (FH9) factors, 
four US Carhart factors, four Global Carhart factors, four European Carhart factors, two Agarwal–Naik 
option factors (Call_OTM and Put_OTM), and three additional factors (BaB, QMJ, PS). BaB is the 
betting-against-beta –factor proposed by Frazzini and Pederssen (2014). QMJ is the quality-minus-Junk 
–factor proposed by Asness, Frazzini and Pederssen (2013). PS is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
Liquidity risk –factor. 
Right-hand size of Panel A of Table B4 shows that our results holds even after taking into 
account a large set of risk-factors. Hence, we believe that the omitted risk factors do not drive our 
results. 
Panel B of Table B4 shows that our results are consistent across investment objectives. This 
finding suggests that performance differences between ARUs and HFs are not specific to those 
objectives and so points to more fundamental differences between the two groups. The HFs and ARUs 
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that employ a Long Only strategy exhibit an interesting convergence in terms of risk and performance. 
Perhaps that is because, in this investment style, impediments to implementation of hedge fund–like 
strategies are less significant owing to the lower probability of hedge funds in this group using 
derivatives and other dynamic trading strategies 
 
 
B.4. Performance Persistence 
 
For performance persistence testing, we conduct sorts on 24-month alpha t-statistics. The baseline 
Figures 3 and 4 presented in paper provide results when the portfolio is rebalanced at  “monthly”, 
“bimonthly”, “quarterly”, “triannual”, “semiannual” and “annual” horizons, corresponding to a 
rebalancing frequency of 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 12 months, respectively.
6
 
Tables B5 and B6 report a large set of performance and risk measures for monthly and annual 
sorts.
7
 Bootstrapped spread and monotonicity tests are based on 5,000 Politis–Romano block bootstrap 
replications with an expected block length of six months. The replications are generated from the 
sorted portfolios using the same sample dates for each portfolio, and thus preserve the dependency 
structure between the portfolios. We find that the conclusion is robust across a wide range of 
performance measures. 
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Table B1: Universe of UCITS-compliant funds 
 
This table reports the number of unique UCITS-share classes our aggregate database contains from January 2003 
to June 2013. ‘Raw sample’ is the number of unique funds. ’12 returns observations’ is the number of funds after 
requiring 12 return observations. ‘Size-and backfill adjustment’ is the number of funds after we have done 
simultaneously, by removing all observations that are either among the first 12 return observations, or are 
observed before first hitting the minimum AUM of $5 million. 
 
 
 
Raw sample 12 return observations Size-and backfill adjustments 
AUD 1 1 0 
CHF 9 7 5 
EUR 808 524 296 
GBP 173 119 70 
JPY 9 9 3 
NOK 15 7 3 
SEK 8 8 6 
USD 349 195 103 
 
1372 870 486 
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Table B2: Suspicious Patterns in Reported Returns in Europe 
 
This table compares suspicious patterns in reported returns of absolute return UCITS (ARU) and hedge funds 
(HF) domiciled in Europe. We require that each fund has at least 24 return observations over the period from 
January 2005 to June 2013. A set of used measures is based on Bollen and Pool (2012). Greater manipulation in 
reported returns are indicated by + or − sigs. Table reports the cross-sectional means and their difference tests. 
‘Autocorrelation’ refers to the test statistic of the first-order coefficient in a MA(1) model of returns. ‘Kink’ 
refers to the test statistic of the kink flag, measuring the abnormal rate of reporting small losses. ‘Index R²’ is the 
p-value of the slope coefficient from a regression of fund returns on a corresponding style index. ‘Max R²’ refers 
to the adjusted R-square of fund returns against the seven Fung-Hsieh factors and the four Agarwal-Naik factors. 
‘% Repeat’ is triggered by a high number of returns that are repeated. ‘# Zero’ refers to the number of zero 
returns. ‘% Negative’ refers to the fraction of negative returns. ‘Uniform’ refers to the test statistic of the 
uniformity of the last digit in reported returns. ‘PC Misvalution’ is the 1st principal component of the Bollen-
Pool (2012) ‘red flags’. 
 
 
‘Red Flag’ Manipulation ARU European HFs Diff Stat 
N  870 3496 
  
Autocorrelation + 0.10 0.11 -0.01 -1.56 
Kink − 0.11 -0.12 0.23 4.97 
 
 
    
Index R
 
 + 0.02 0.06 -0.04 -9.26 
Max R
2
 − 0.57 0.45 0.11 15.77 
      
% Repeat + 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -5.68 
# Zero + 0.27 0.56 -0.29 -4.98 
% Negative − 0.42 0.4 0.02 4.33 
Uniform + 15.79 16.23 -0.44 -1.38 
 
 
    
PC Misvaluation + -0.30 -0.04 -0.26 -7.85 
 
 
    
  
15 
 
Table B3: Determinants of -score 
 
This table shows the results from the probit regressions of the ω-score both for ‘All funds’ and for European 
funds only (Europe). The dependent variable in the ω regressions is the Problem indicator based on the Item 11 
of Form ADV on June 2013. The explanatory variables are the fund’s management fee (ManagementFee), 
incentive fee (IncentiveFee), high-water mark dummy (HighwaterMark), notice period (Notice), lockup dummy 
(LockupDummy), leverage dummy (LeverageDummy), rolling mean return (AvgReturn), rolling volatility 
(StdDev), rolling autocorrelation (AutoCorr), rolling maximum logarithmic fund’s AUM (Log_AUM), and 
rolling fund’s age (Age), Rolling variables are based on a 12-month window. Significance is shown by + (p < 
0.10), * (p < 0.05) and ** (p < 0.01). 
 
 
  
ω -score 
 Variable 
 
All funds Europe 
 Intercept   -0.99** -0.60*   
AvgReturn 
 
-13.94** -43.43** 
 StdDev 
 
-0.63 -5.72** 
 AutoCorr 
 
-0.18+ 0.03 
 Log(AUM) 
 
0.12** 0.11** 
 Age 
 
-0.02** -0.02 
 Management Fee 
 
-5.94 5.08 
 Incentive Fee 
 
1.11** 1.45 
 High-Water Mark 
 
-0.03** -0.08 
 Notice period 
 
-0.99** -1.95+ 
 Lockup Dummy 
 
-0.13** 0.84* 
 Leverage Dummy 
 
0.09* 0.22+ 
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Table B4: Risk-adjusted Performance and Risk 
 
Left-hand side of Panel A presents results using local currencies (without any currency transformation), while right hand-side of panel A presents 
results using the step-wise regression containing 26 factors described in Appendix B.  Panel B presents risk-adjusted performance and risk 
measures for Absolute Return UCITS (ARU) and hedge funds (HF) across investment. Measures are computed for fund that have at least 24 return 
observations. Mean denotes the fund’s average return. Std denotes the fund’s return standard deviation. Sharpe denotes the annualized Sharpe ratio.  
ES denotes historical expected shortfall at the 10% level. MPPM is the, Ingersoll, Goetzmann, Spiegel and Welch’s (2007) Manipulation-proof 
Performance Measure. Alpha is the annualized 9-factor Fung and Hsieh (2004) alpha within a specific category. t-stat presents the  t-statistic of FH 
alpha. SystRisk is defined as the difference of return standard deviation and residual risk. IdioRisk denotes the residual risk that is obtained from 
the 9-factor model. R² is the adjusted R-squared of the 9-factor 
model. 
 
Panel A: Local Currencies and Stepwise Regression 
             
  
Local Currencies 
 
Step-wise Regression with 25 factors 
 
N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 456 2.14 9.93 4.92 0.27 -0.33 
 
-0.77 -0.25 9.98 4.53 0.89 
HF 8458 4.22 10.88 4.93 0.42 0.91 
 
1.09 0.26 6.65 6.6 0.67 
Diff 
 
-2.08 -0.95 -0.02 -0.15 -1.24 
 
-1.86 -0.51 3.33 -2.07 0.22 
Stat 
 
-6.15 -1.9 -0.23 -6.16 -4.94 
 
-6.15 -6.98 14.39 -12.52 20.94 
 
Panel B: Main Strategies 
 
CTA N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 24 -0.98 15.09 -0.06 7.62 -6.50 
 
-1.27 -0.17 7.33 7.55 0.56 
HF 752 0.78 14.99 0.05 7.12 -5.15 
 
-0.86 -0.12 4.09 9.65 0.24 
Difference 
 
-1.75 0.10 -0.12 0.50 -1.34 
 
-0.41 -0.05 3.24 -2.10 0.33 
t-statistic   -2.30 0.86 -2.01 1.49 -1.53 
 
-1.47 -1.23 3.50 -1.00 4.41 
Emerging Markets N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 77 1.79 22.26 0.09 11.48 -10.52 
 
-0.35 -0.06 13.87 7.30 0.82 
HF 1334 2.89 17.60 0.17 8.73 -4.59 
 
1.24 0.19 7.53 8.93 0.58 
Difference 
 
-1.10 4.66 -0.09 2.75 -5.93 
 
-1.59 -0.24 6.35 -1.63 0.25 
t-statistic   -0.95 3.97 -2.02 4.92 -3.74 
 
-2.24 -2.58 7.78 -3.01 8.83 
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Global Macro N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 36 -0.12 11.94 -0.05 6.42 -3.91 
 
-1.45 -0.36 6.84 5.12 0.71 
HF 443 1.46 14.09 0.12 7.18 -3.75 
 
0.09 0.01 4.95 7.11 0.46 
Difference 
 
-1.58 -2.15 -0.17 -0.76 -0.15 
 
-1.54 -0.37 1.89 -1.99 0.25 
t-statistic   -2.13 -2.19 -1.77 -1.05 -0.09 
 
-2.12 -2.51 1.51 -5.25 4.67 
             
Long Only N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 80 4.84 18.45 0.29 9.27 -4.02 
 
-1.38 -0.20 12.49 5.36 0.87 
HF 288 6.75 17.19 0.47 8.00 0.36 
 
1.64 0.29 8.91 6.35 0.77 
Difference 
 
-1.91 1.26 -0.18 1.27 -4.38 
 
-3.01 -0.49 3.58 -0.99 0.10 
t-statistic   -2.72 1.29 -4.02 2.34 -3.47 
 
-4.02 -4.17 4.07 -2.56 5.30 
             
Long/Short N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 80 2.75 15.72 0.17 8.08 -4.38 
 
1.38 0.29 9.03 5.93 0.78 
HF 2136 4.71 14.91 0.36 7.03 -0.79 
 
0.78 0.14 6.47 7.38 0.59 
Difference 
 
-1.96 0.81 -0.18 1.05 -3.58 
 
0.59 0.15 2.56 -1.44 0.19 
t-statistic   -2.80 1.69 -3.90 3.26 -3.51 
 
0.67 0.59 5.21 -3.52 6.79 
             
Market Neutral N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 27 0.55 12.91 0.05 4.79 -3.63 
 
1.63 0.35 7.69 4.63 0.79 
HF 346 3.07 10.13 0.33 6.45 0.59 
 
1.77 0.33 2.51 6.04 0.30 
Difference 
 
-2.52 2.78 -0.28 1.66 -4.22 
 
-0.14 0.02 5.18 -1.41 0.49 
t-statistic   -2.85 2.31 -3.39 3.16 -3.54 
 
-0.66 0.75 4.18 -1.92 5.48 
             
Multi-Strategy N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 33 -0.97 13.97 -0.10 7.26 -5.70 
 
-0.42 -0.15 7.50 5.76 0.77 
HF 1454 1.75 15.36 0.12 7.56 -3.76 
 
-0.37 -0.05 7.11 7.17 0.57 
Difference 
 
-2.72 -1.39 -0.23 -0.30 -1.94 
 
-0.06 -0.09 0.39 -1.41 0.20 
t-statistic   -2.70 -1.33 -2.65 -0.52 -1.09 
 
-0.17 -0.31 1.32 -2.94 3.94 
             
Relative Value N Mean Std Sharpe ES MPPM 
 
Alpha t-stat SystRisk IdioRisk R² 
ARU 71 1.29 12.67 0.09 6.83 -2.45 
 
1.40 0.36 7.98 4.44 0.82 
HF 830 5.53 9.39 0.64 4.23 2.98 
 
3.06 0.73 2.80 4.97 0.40 
Difference 
 
-4.24 3.28 -0.55 2.60 -5.43 
 
-1.66 -0.36 5.19 -0.53 0.42 
t-statistic   -5.44 4.21 -6.84 5.55 -6.46 
 
-1.94 -2.31 7.50 -2.12 9.05 
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Table B5: Performance Persistence at the Monthly Horizons 
 
For persistence testing, we perform equal-weighted sorts based on 24-month rolling alpha t-statistics. All sorts 
are based on USD returns of backfill- and size-adjusted funds. Bootstrapped spread and monotonicity tests are 
based on 5,000 Politis–Romano block bootstrap replications with an expected block length of six months. The 
replications are generated from the sorted portfolios using the same sample dates for each portfolio, and thus 
preserve the dependency structure between the portfolios. 
Panel A: ARUs 
 
 
Alpha t-statistic Appraisal Sharpe MPPM ES 
Bottom -1.78 -1.06 -0.36 0.20 -2.61 9.34 
1 -1.58 -1.01 -0.35 0.19 -5.02 11.59 
2 -1.41 -0.87 -0.30 0.22 -4.29 11.81 
3 -2.55 -1.57 -0.54 0.19 -4.00 10.96 
Top 0.39 0.24 0.08 0.30 -1.47 10.33 
Diff 2.18 1.30 0.45 0.10 1.14 1.00 
tHAC 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.60 0.38 0.55 
       
pMR_Up 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.52 0.34 
pMR_Down 0.70 0.63 0.63 0.51 0.51 0.86 
       
Panel B: Hedge Funds 
 
 
Alpha t-statistic Appraisal Sharpe MPPM ES 
Bottom -2.50 -2.36 -0.81 0.07 -1.86 6.77 
1 -0.28 -0.26 -0.09 0.27 0.20 6.55 
2 1.66 1.51 0.52 0.45 1.96 5.51 
3 2.05 2.14 0.73 0.51 2.42 5.49 
Top 3.41 3.96 1.36 0.76 3.88 4.41 
Diff 5.91 6.32 2.17 0.69 5.73 -2.37 
tHAC 6.89 6.23 6.23 3.79 3.65 -5.97 
       
pMR_Up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.94 
pMR_Down 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.00 
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Panel C: Liquid Hedge Funds  
 
 
Alpha t-statistic Appraisal Sharpe MPPM ES 
Bottom -3.89 -2.98 -1.02 0.05 -3.67 8.89 
1 -0.14 -0.10 -0.03 0.32 0.21 7.62 
2 2.81 1.63 0.56 0.44 1.59 7.37 
3 2.49 1.51 0.52 0.46 1.67 7.47 
Top 1.83 1.10 0.38 0.36 0.32 8.35 
Diff 5.72 4.08 1.40 0.31 3.99 -0.53 
tHAC 3.26 3.13 3.13 1.86 1.96 -0.39 
       
pMR_Up 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.38 0.47 0.79 
pMR_Down 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.60 
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Table B6: Performance Persistence at the Annual Horizons 
 
For persistence testing, we perform equal-weighted sorts based on 24-month rolling alpha t-statistics. All sorts 
are based on USD returns of backfill- and size-adjusted funds. Bootstrapped spread and monotonicity tests are 
based on 5,000 Politis–Romano block bootstrap replications with an expected block length of six months. The 
replications are generated from the sorted portfolios using the same sample dates for each portfolio, and thus 
preserve the dependency structure between the portfolios. 
Panel A: ARUs 
 
 
Alpha t-statistic Appraisal Sharpe MPPM ES 
Bottom 0.38 0.21 0.07 0.33 -0.13 8.29 
1 -3.16 -1.95 -0.67 0.11 -5.98 11.36 
2 -2.53 -1.56 -0.53 0.16 -6.21 12.21 
3 -2.98 -1.84 -0.63 0.15 -6.46 12.26 
Top 0.18 0.11 0.04 0.29 -1.02 9.27 
Diff -0.20 -0.10 -0.03 -0.04 -0.89 0.98 
tHAC -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.24 -0.33 0.56 
       
pMR_Up 0.68 0.63 0.63 0.70 0.64 0.83 
pMR_Down 0.56 0.51 0.51 0.45 0.62 0.90 
       
Panel B: Hedge Funds 
 
 
Alpha t-statistic Appraisal Sharpe MPPM ES 
Bottom -0.95 -0.84 -0.29 0.22 -0.27 6.23 
1 1.02 1.02 0.35 0.40 1.52 6.11 
2 1.34 1.15 0.39 0.42 1.65 5.91 
3 1.07 1.04 0.36 0.41 1.64 5.51 
Top 2.22 2.72 0.93 0.56 2.59 4.81 
Diff 3.17 3.56 1.22 0.33 2.86 -1.42 
tHAC 2.88 3.01 3.01 1.82 1.83 -2.25 
       
pMR_Up 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.09 0.92 
pMR_Down 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.89 0.97 0.01 
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Panel C: Liquid Hedge Funds 
 
 
Alpha t-statistic Appraisal Sharpe MPPM ES 
Bottom -2.38 -1.64 -0.56 0.12 -2.58 8.39 
1 -0.35 -0.24 -0.08 0.30 -0.08 7.77 
2 2.21 1.23 0.42 0.41 0.92 8.44 
3 0.62 0.33 0.11 0.33 0.16 7.94 
Top 3.58 2.15 0.74 0.49 2.13 7.33 
Diff 5.95 3.79 1.30 0.37 4.71 -1.07 
tHAC 3.96 3.85 3.85 2.45 2.43 -0.89 
       
pMR_Up 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.20 0.11 0.37 
pMR_Down 0.79 0.75 0.75 0.65 0.73 0.35 
 
